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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon this Court by 
Utah Constitution, Art. 8, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument that 
guilt should be inferred because Mr. Dunn invoked his right to 
counsel during his arrest, and that the jury should consider the 
impact of its verdict upon society in deciding Mr. Dunn's guilt or 
innocence, improperly prejudice the jury. 
2. Did the trial court improperly admit evidence of Mr. 
Dunn's prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon in 
connection with an abduction after Mr. Dunn had taken the witness 
stand in his own defense in reliance on a pretrial ruling excluding 
such evidence. 
3. Was the circumstantial evidence adduced by the State on 
its case-in-chief so inconclusive and unreliable that reasonable 
minds could not have convicted Mr. Dunn beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. Did the admission of evidence found in a warrantless 
search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag violate the federal and state 
constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
5. Did the admission of a gruesome color photograph of the 
bloody corpse of the victim stuffed into the bathroom of the 
1 
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motorhome constitute reversible error when the photograph had no 
unusual probative value, any facts established by the photograph 
were or could have been established by other means and were not 
contested by Mr. Dunn, and the State's evidence against Mr. Dunn 
was weak. 
6. Did defense counsel's failure to request proper jury 
instructions on uncorroborated accomplice testimony and the defense 
of compulsion, when the State contended that Mr. Dunn was guilty 
only as an accomplice, constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the Sixth 
Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, Utah, the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding, by which the defendant-appellant 
was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. 
A copy of the Judgment of Conviction is attached as Addendum A.1 
Mr. Dunn seeks reversal of the convictions, or, at a minimum, 
a new trial. 
xMr. Dunn's 1981 conviction was originally affirmed by this 
Court in 1982. State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 709 (Utah 1982). In 1990, 
this Court reinstated Mr. Dunn's direct appeal after concluding, 
on writ of habeas corpus, that Mr. Dunn's first appeal was 
constitutionally defective due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, noting that "there might be some merit to some of Dunn's 
issues." Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1990). Mr. Dunn 
has been incarcerated since 1981. 
2 
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Statement of the Facts 
On January 5, 1981, after a four-day jury trial in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Don V, Tibbs presiding, 
appellant Robert W. Dunn was convicted of second degree murder 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978), a first degree felony, and 
aggravated kidnapping under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1978), then 
a capital felony,2 for which he received concurrent sentences of 
five years to life and life imprisonment. Mr. Dunn, an indigent, 
had been represented at trial by Marcus Taylor, an attorney 
appointed by the court. 
The Case-In-Chief 
The evidence adduced against Mr. Dunn on the State's case-in-
chief was entirely circumstantial. That evidence showed that on 
August 14, 1980, the Utah Highway Patrol received a telephone call 
from a hitchhiker who reported that he had seen a man pounding on 
the rear window from inside the back of a motorhome as it pulled 
away from a service station in Richfield, Utah. T. 250-52, 260.3 
Shortly afterward, UHP Trooper Bud Larsen stopped a vehicle fitting 
the description given by the hitchhiker. Mr. Dunn was driving. 
Aggravated kidnapping was reduced to a first degree felony by 
a 1983 amendment. 
3As cited herein, "T. " refers to a copy of the original 
trial transcript, which is on file with the Court as part of a 
reconstructed record pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the original indexed and paginated trial 
record having been destroyed by the Attorney General's office 
during Mr. Dunn's habeas proceedings in this Court. 
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T. 260-62. As Trooper Larsen approached the driver's side of the 
vehicle, a second man, later identified as Howard Scott, appeared 
from inside the back of the motorhome and sat in the front 
passenger seat. T. 442. The body of Ernest Sprinkle, dead from • 
two gunshot wounds to his chest and abdomen, was found on the floor 
of the bathroom in the back of the motorhome. T. 263. 
The next day, the motorhome was searched pursuant to a *tl 
warrant. A .25 calibre automatic pistol was found under the 
mattress in a sleeping compartment above the cab of the motorhome, 
on the passenger's side. T. 273-74. Two spent shells, fired from 0 
the pistol, were found inside a stove in the back of the motorhome. 
T. 291-94. 
The State admitted that Scott was the triggerman, but I 
contended that Mr. Dunn was guilty as an accomplice. T. 230, 246. 
Other than Mr. Dunn's mere presence in the motorhome, only two 
pieces of evidence adduced by the State on its case-in-chief $ 
connected Mr. Dunn to the crime. Deputy Gerald Nice testified that 
Scott, during an interrogation in which he confessed to having tied 
up and shot Sprinkle himself, claimed that the gun belonged to Mr. i 
Dunn. T. 317. And, a supply of unspent .25 calibre rounds was 
found inside a duffle bag identified as belonging to Mr. Dunn. 
T. 277-78, 287-88. Other evidence, however, suggested that the gun f| 
belonged to Scott, T. 374-75, and that Scott had stashed the bag 
1 
4 
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of bullets in Mr. Dunn's duffle bag. T. 294-97, 319, 344, 345-
46. 
The Search 
At trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the contents of 
the duffle bag. T. 285-86. Evidence received on the suppression 
motion showed that at the jail on the night of his arrest, Mr. Dunn 
advised Deputy Sheriff Clyde Page that he had a medical condition 
and asked him to retrieve his prescription medicine from his duffle 
bag which had been left in the motorhome. T. 279-80. Mr. Dunn 
described the bag as a yellow duffle bag with some shoes tied on 
it. T. 283. Deputy Page informed Mr. Dunn that a search of the 
motorhome would be conducted the next day and that he would get Mr. 
Dunn's medicine then. T. 280. 
The next day, a warrant was obtained for a search of the 
motorhome and its contents and an extensive, six-hour search was 
conducted. A yellow duffle bag was found in the rear of the 
motorhome, but was not opened or searched at that time. T. 280-
81. Instead, because it was getting late and he believed he had 
the right to search anything found in the motorhome, Deputy Page 
brought the bag to the jail. T. 280, 284. There, he searched the 
duffle bag in the presence of Sheriff Rex Huntsman and Sevier 
County Attorney R. Don Brown. T. 280-84. A bag of ammunition was 
found at the top of the duffle bag. T. 283. Near the bottom of 
5 
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the duffle bag, Deputy Page found several vials of prescription 
medicine. T. 283. 
Further evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing and at 
trial established that Mr. Dunn had instructed the police that his 
medicine was at the bottom of the duffle bag, P. 1214, and that the 
first item found by Deputy Page at the top of the duffle bag was 
a blue bag which he described as a "bank bag." T. 296. The blue 
bag contained some toilet articles and a small red bag closed with 
a drawstring. Only upon opening the red bag, did Deputy Page find 
the unspent bullets. T. 296; P. 121-23. 
The Photograph 
Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude from evidence 
a color photograph taken by police of the bloody corpse of the 
victim stuffed into the bathroom of the motorhome. T. 227-28; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Defense counsel argued the photograph was 
inflammatory and unnecessary because the fact and manner of the 
homicide was uncontested. T. 227. Indeed, the State did not 
contend that Mr. Dunn either physically struck the victim, T. 230, 
or fired the pistol killing the victim. T. 305. An autopsy report 
and photograph of the body were admitted into evidence pursuant to 
stipulation. T. 320-21. The trial court denied the motion and the 
photograph was received in evidence at trial. T. 229-300. 
4As cited herein, "P. " refers to a copy of the original 
preliminary hearing transcript which is on file with the Court as 
part of the reconstructed record. 
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The Defense 
Mr. Dunn testified in his own defense as follows: In early 
August 1980, he was hitchhiking to Texas from his home in San 
Francisco to visit his mother and to seek employment. T. 398-99. 
In Barstow, California, Sprinkle stopped his motorhome and offered 
Mr. Dunn a ride to Las Vegas. T. 401-02. Sprinkle also agreed to 
give Scott, and a third hitchhiker named Pete, a ride. T. 402-03. 
Scott was quiet during the ride, rarely saying anything except 
to himself. T. 403. Sprinkle stopped once at a gas station to buy 
a six-pack of beer, and again at a small town just south of Las 
Vegas, where he went into a casino and gambled for an hour. 
T. 404. 
The motorhome arrived in Las Vegas just before dark on August 
13, 1980. T. 405. There, the hitchhikers removed their belongings 
from the motorhome and the four men went their separate ways. 
T. 405-08. Occasionally, however, Mr. Dunn, Scott and Sprinkle ran 
into each other in various casinos. T. 407-08. Sprinkle was 
playing "21" and drinking heavily. T. 409. Throughout the night 
he would give Mr. Dunn and Scott small amounts of money for 
gambling and buying drinks. T. 404, 407, 409-11, 470. Around 
11:00 p.m., Sprinkle offered Mr. Dunn and Scott a ride to Colorado. 
T. 411. 
About five miles outside of Las Vegas, Sprinkle pulled over 
and asked Scott to drive, but he declined because he did not have 
7 
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a driver's license. Sprinkle then asked Mr. Dunn to drive and he 
agreed because Sprinkle had been weaving on the road. T. 413-14. 
When they reached Mesquite, Nevada, they again stopped at a casino. 
T. 415. Sprinkle went straight to the gambling tables and 
continued to drink and play "21". Mr. Dunn had breakfast in the 
casino cafe. Scott joined Sprinkle in gambling, and would 
sometimes steal poker chips from Sprinkle, cashing them in and 
pocketing the money. T. 419-20. 
They left Mesquite at daybreak, with Mr. Dunn driving because 
Sprinkle was too inebriated to drive. At one point, Sprinkle went 
into the back and laid down on the floor and Scott sat in the 
passenger's seat. Mr. Dunn tried to strike up a conversation with 
Scott, but Scott kept mostly to himself. After they had travelled 
a while, Scott went into the back and, without saying a word, hit 
Sprinkle over the head. Sprinkle jumped up and said, "Don't hurt 
me and I'll give you anything you want." Pointing a gun, which 
Mr. Dunn had never seen before, at Sprinkle's head, Scott ordered 
Sprinkle to shut up or he would blow his head off. Scott also 
ordered Mr. Dunn to keep quiet. Frightened, Mr. Dunn continued to 
drive. Scott tied Sprinkle's wrists together and put him in the 
bathroom. T. 422-27. 
When they reached Richfield, Utah, Scott ordered Mr. Dunn to 
pull into an Amoco station to buy a fuse for the CB radio. T. 431. 
Scott was holding the gun in his hand as they pulled into the 
8 
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station, and, while there, Scott would not let Mr. Dunn out of his 
reach. T. 432-34. At Scott's orders, Mr. Dunn bought the fuse and 
tried to install it. He was shaking with fear and trying to 
install the fuse when he heard a noise in the back. T. 435. He 
turned his head and saw Sprinkle coming out of the bathroom. 
T. 435-36. Scott ran for Sprinkle, again forcing him into the 
bathroom and yelled, "Get this damn thing out of here." T. 436. 
Scared, Mr. Dunn pulled out of the station, almost colliding with 
a truck. Mr. Dunn heard noises and shouting in the back of the 
motorhome, but could not see all that was going on. T. 437-38. 
A couple of miles down the road, he heard the gun go off. T. 438. 
Several times during the above episode, Scott had threatened Mr. 
Dunn with the gun. Thinking for sure he was next, Mr. Dunn drove 
slowly through the town deliberately missing the 1-70 turnoff and 
hoping to catch someone?s attention. T. 438-441. A short while 
later, the motorhome was stopped by the police. Mr. Dunn felt 
relieved when the officer ordered him to step out of the vehicle. 
T. 443. 
The Prior Conviction 
Defense counsel moved before trial to exclude Mr. Dunn's 1973 
felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. T. 234. The 
trial court ruled the prior conviction inadmissible except to 
impeach or rebut character evidence offered by the defense. 
T. 236-37. In reliance on that ruling, Mr. Dunn testified without 
9 
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putting his character in issue. T. 388-445. After Mr. Dunn had 
testified on direct, the State moved to admit the prior conviction 
and the court reversed its pretrial ruling. T. 444, 447. On 
cross-examination, Mr. Dunn was required to testify not only that 
he had been convicted of the felony charge, but also that the crime 
involved the abduction of a girl. T. 447. 
Testimony of Howard Scott 
The only direct evidence against Mr. Dunn adduced by the State 
was the testimony of Howard Scott, the admitted triggerman. Scott 
was called by the State only on rebuttal. T. 491. After obtaining 
a hung jury at his own trial for the Sprinkle murder two weeks 
earlier, T. 498, Scott had given a recorded statement about the 
crime and pleaded guilty to second degree murder in exchange for 
his testimony against Mr. Dunn. T. 519. Scott testified that Mr. 
Dunn wanted to rob Sprinkle, and that they both tied Sprinkle up 
and put him in the motorhome. T. 493. He claimed he hit Sprinkle 
on the head and shot him, using a gun belonging to Mr. Dunn, only 
because Mr. Dunn had told him to. T. 492-94. 
On cross examination, Scott denied having entered the plea 
bargain and claimed to have no recollection of the recorded 
statement. T. 498, 509. The State elicited testimony on redirect 
that Scott was a diagnosed pathological liar. T. 510. The 
prosecutor then impeached his own witness by taking the stand on 
surrebuttal to establish the existence and terms of Scott's guilty 
10 
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plea and the contents of the recorded statement. T. 518-19. Both 
the recorded statement and Scottfs trial testimony were 
inconsistent with several prior statements Scott had made about the 
crime which exculpated Mr. Dunn. T. 309-315, 395-96, 481-83, 497-
510. In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Scott 
"would tell a lie any time to make him look good." T. 556. 
Closing Argument 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor made reference to Mr. 
Dunn's request for counsel at the arrest scene. T. 575. The 
prosecutor used this remark to infer guilt on the part of Mr. Dunn, 
and to disparage his defense of coercion and duress. 1x3. The 
State also argued to the jury that they should consider societal 
concern and outrage regarding the crime in deciding Mr. Dunn's 
guilt or innocence, T. 549, and referred to pretrial publicity 
surrounding the case and the fact that the victim did not have 
twelve jurors to decide whether he should live or die. T. 548. 
Jury Instructions 
Defense counsel did not request, nor did the court give, any 
jury instruction regarding uncorroborated accomplice testimony. 
T. 531-48. The court gave an instruction on Mr. Dunn's defense of 
compulsion, but the instruction was improper because it did not 
state the prosecution has the burden to prove the absence of 
evidence supporting the affirmative defense. T. 544. A copy of 
Jury Instruction No. 30 is included as Addendum B. 
11 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
During closing argument at Mr. Dunn's trial, the prosecutor 
made remarks suggesting that the jury should infer Mr. Dunn's guilt 
from his invocation of his right to counsel at his arrest and 4 
consider the impact of its verdict upon society in determining Mr. 
Dunn's guilt or innocence. Similar remarks by the same prosecutor 
have been held improper by this Court in other cases. £ 
Before Mr. Dunn took the witness stand in his own defense, the 
trial court ruled that his prior conviction of assault with a 
deadly weapon was inadmissible unless Mr. Dunn adduced evidence of 4 
his own "good character." Mr. Dunn took the stand in reliance upon 
the trial court's ruling and did not give character testimony. On 
cross-examination, the trial court reversed its prior ruling and £ 
allowed the prosector to question Mr. Dunn concerning the 
conviction and its circumstances. The trial court's reversal of 
its own prior ruling was unfairly prejudicial. The prejudicial <l 
effect of the trial court's ruling after Mr. Dunn had testified was 
heightened by the fact that the prior conviction involved an 
abduction and was similar to the aggravated kidnapping charge in 4 
this case. 
Mr. Dunn was charged in the abduction and killing of Sprinkle 
only as an accomplice. The evidence presented by the State on its 4 
case-in-chief was entirely circumstantial, failed to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dunn had the requisite specific 
I 
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intent to assist Scott in committing the crimes, and failed to 
eliminate all reasonable alternative hypotheses of innocence. 
Reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Mr. 
Dunn's guilt and his conviction should therefore be reversed. 
A key piece of the evidence adduced by the State against Mr. 
Dunn was a bag of unspent bullets found in a duffle bag identified 
as belonging to Mr. Dunn. That evidence was discovered in an 
unlawful search of the duffle bag and should have been suppressed. 
The search of the duffle bag violated the fourth amendment of the 
United States Constitution because it was neither within the scope 
of a warrant issued for the search of the motorhome, nor within any 
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. The search also 
violated article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution because 
there were no exigent circumstances for a warrantless search of the 
bag. 
The trial court erroneously received in evidence a gruesome 
color photograph of the corpse of the victim. The photograph was 
presumptively unfairly prejudicial because it had no unusual 
probative, or essential evidentiary, value. Thus, admission of the 
photograph was contrary to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Although the only direct evidence adduced against Mr. Dunn was 
the uncorroborated testimony of Scott, Mr. Dunn's defense counsel 
failed to request a cautionary instruction on uncorroborated 
accomplice testimony. Although Mr. Dunn's only defense was 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compulsion, defense counsel failed to request an instruction 
explaining that the prosecution must disprove that defense beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Reasonably competent counsel would have 
requested these instructions which were critical to the defense 
and, but for these errors, it is reasonably probable that the jury 
would have acquitted Mr. Dunn. 
The conviction should be reversed based upon the insufficiency 
of the evidence. At a minimum, a new trial is required. Given the 
weakness of the State's case against Mr. Dunn, which was primarily 
based upon circumstantial evidence, none of the above errors can 
be viewed as harmless. In addition, the cumulative effect of those 
errors leaves no doubt that Mr. Dunn was deprived of a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT IMPROPERLY PREJUDICED 
THE JURY AND LEAD TO CONSIDERATION OF IMPERMISSIBLE 
FACTORS 
During closing argument, the prosecutor made several improper, 
prejudicial remarks. Some of these remarks attempted to infer Mr. 
Dunn's guilt because he invoked his right to counsel: 
[Officer Larson] came up to the vehicle and 
Mr. Dunn told him that this was a drive-out 
vehicle from California. How did he appear? 
Calm, very calm. Then what happened? Officer 
Larson found the body and walked up to him and 
said "What can you tell me about the body back 
there?" What does Mr. Dunn say? "I want a 
lawyer. I want a lawyer." Is that a 
frightened man? Is that a man that's so 
frightened . . . that he doesn't know what to 
do or how to get away? "I want a lawyer." 
(T 575). 
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Defense counsel objected, but the trial judge erroneously ruled 
that this was proper argument, T. 576• 
An attempt by the State to infer guilt from a defendant's 
exercise of his constitutionally protected right to counsel is a 
denial of that constitutional right and is impermissible 
prosecutorial conduct. Zemina v. Solem, 438 F.Supp. 455, 465-66 
(D.S.D. 1977), aff 'd. Zemina v. Solem, 573 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 
1978); State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1980). 
The prosecutor's improper argument was not harmless. At 
trial, Mr. Dunn's only defense was compulsion. The prosecutor's 
argument went to Mr. Dunn's state of mind and was intended to 
undermine this defense. The prosecutor's improper argument 
impermissibly compromised constitutionally guaranteed rights. See 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986). 
The prosecutor's impermissible argument was likely to have 
influenced the jury. See State v. Smith, 700 P. 2d 1106 (1985). 
Where, as here, proof of an accused's guilt is based upon 
circumstantial evidence, there is a greater likelihood that the 
jury was improperly influenced by the prosecutor's remarks. State 
v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984). The prejudicial effect 
of the prosecutor's improper remarks was particularly strong in 
this case as they were made during rebuttal, thus preventing 
defense counsel from challenging the prosecutor's suggestion. 
Given the context in which the prosecutorial remarks were made, and 
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the constitutional rights involved, the use of Mr. Dunn's request 
for an attorney to infer guilt requires reversal and a new trial. 
The prosecutor made another improper argument which called to 
the attention of the jurors matters they should not have 
considered. The prosecutor stated: 
even more important than Ernest Sprinkle, 
Robert Dunn and Howard Scott or anyone else, 
is the impact that every jury decision has on 
the criminal system and that? s the most 
important factor you need to consider in 
reaching a just and honest decision here today 
because you're going to have to live with it 
and so is society and you are all aware of the 
publicity that surrounds this case, that 
surrounds any first degree murder case and the 
impact that it has when the jury reaches a 
verdict one way or another. Make sure before 
you determine that there is reasonable doubt, 
make sure that before you elevate some of the 
concerns to the point of a reasonable doubt, 
that you are being fair to the most important 
segment of society at large. 
T. 549. In two cases involving the same county attorney who 
prosecuted this case, this Court has held that similar suggestions 
that the jury has a duty to convict on some basis other than the 
evidence are improper argument. See State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 
400, 402 (Utah 1986); State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 
1985). Here, the prosecutor suggested that, apart from the 
evidence before it, the jury had an obligation to convict Mr. Dunn 
based on societal concerns. The prosecutor also attempted to stir 
the juror's emotions by suggesting that the victim was not afforded 
twelve jurors to determine whether he should live or die. T.548. 
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These statements were totally outside the evidence and were 
flagrant attempts to inflame the passions of the jury. 
In State v. Smith, in remarks strikingly similar to those he 
made in this case, prosecutor R. Don Brown told the jury: 
It!s not Curtis Ray Smith that's on trial 
alone. It's our way of life, you and I, and 
how the public is going to perceive how the 
criminal law does its job. Do we go so far in 
determining that we don't punish an innocent 
man that we let too many guilty ones go or do 
we look at the cold hard facts and, even 
though the hammer of justice is about to fall, 
do our jobs, because ladies and gentlemen, if 
we don't, we know what the result is going to 
be. 
Id. In finding that the prosecutor erred in including the remarks 
in his summation, the Court explained that the remarks "suggested 
that the jury had some obligation beyond the determination of the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant solely on the basis of evidence 
introduced at trial." Id. The remarks made to the jury 
considering the charges against Mr. Dunn were just as flagrant, if 
not more so, than those made in Smith and Andreason. The 
prosecutor here told the jury that the "most important factor" in 
their deliberations should be the impact of the verdict on society. 
This was clearly erroneous. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the jurors were 
"probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their 
verdict." Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402. In Andreason, the record 
did not contain substantial or independent evidence of defendant's 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guilt; rather, the State's case relied on circumstantial evidence, 
as was true here. This Court held that given those circumstances, 
the jurors were more likely than not influenced by an improper 
argument and therefore reversed defendant's conviction and remanded 
for a new trial. Id., at 403. 
In similar situations, remarks such as those made by the 
prosecutor in this case have warranted reversal and a new trial. 
The same remedy is mandated here. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF MR. 
DUNN'S PRIOR CONVICTION 
Just before trial, counsel moved to exclude evidence of Mr. 
Dunn's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon ensuing 
out of the abduction of a girl. T. 234. The prosecutor argued 
that if Mr. Dunn testified at trial, the prior conviction was 
admissible as impeachment evidence. T. 235-36. The trial court 
reserved ruling on the admissibility of the prior conviction, but 
clearly stated that it would not admit the evidence unless Mr. Dunn 
put on affirmative evidence of his good character. T. 236. The 
trial court also definitively ruled that the prosecutor could not 
offer the prior conviction as evidence in the State's case-in-
chief. T. 232. The court further required the prosecutor to make 
a motion to the court out of the jury's presence before offering 
evidence of the prior conviction. T. 237-38. 
In reliance on the trial court's ruling, Mr. Dunn elected to 
testify in his own behalf. His testimony carefully avoided any 
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affirmative evidence of good character. T. 388-445. After direct 
examination, the prosecution moved to admit evidence of Mr. Dunn's 
prior conviction for impeachment purposes. At this point, the 
trial court reversed its prior ruling and granted the motion with 
no explanation or discussion about why the evidence should now be 
admitted, even though Mr. Dunn's direct testimony had not offered 
evidence of good character. The prosecution then began its cross 
examination of Mr. Dunn with evidence of the prior conviction. 
Defense counsel objected, but was overruled. T. 446-48. 
Counsel made a pre-trial motion to learn whether the trial 
court would admit the prior conviction if Mr. Dunn testified. The 
court held that it would not if Mr. Dunn presented no evidence of 
good character. Accordingly, Mr. Dunn decided to testify but 
deliberately presented no evidence of good character to avoid the 
admission of his prior conviction. Mr. Dunn relied to his 
detriment upon the court's ruling. It was obviously improper and 
prejudicial for the court to change its ruling after Mr. Dunn 
testified. 
A defendant has the right to a pre-trial ruling on the 
admissibility of prior convictions. State v. Clavo, 520 So.2d 415 
(La. 1987) (case 1); People v. Lytal, 415 Mich. 603, 329 N.W.2d 
738, 740 (1982). At minimum, the trial court should decide 
admissibility before the defendant takes the stand. State v. 
Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 435 n.3 (N.D. 1979); People v. Sandoval, 
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34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 854 (1974). The 
policy underlying these decisions is that of fairness to the 
defendant who must plan his trial strategy based upon the court!s 
ruling. A defendant is significantly disadvantaged if he is forced 
to make an uninformed decision of whether to testify. 
The improper admission of a criminal defendant's prior 
convictions is reversible error. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1335 (Utah 1986). The prejudice resulting from that error was 
compounded in this case because the prior conviction was for an 
offense similar to the one charged. This Court has recognized that 
the similarity of a prior conviction to the one charged "would be 
extremely prejudicial and tend to inflame the jury . . . ." Id. 
The improper admission of Mr. Dunn's prior conviction caused 
substantial prejudice to Mr. Dunn and warrants reversal of his 
conviction and a new trial. 
III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR REASONABLE MINDS TO 
CONVICT MR. DUNN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel made a 
motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that insufficient 
evidence had been adduced against Mr. Dunn to convict him beyond 
a reasonable doubt. T. 323. The motion should have been granted. 
The State bears the burden of proving each element of an 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction should be reversed 
where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict, is so insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable minds 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's 
guilt. State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148-49 (Utah 1983); State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). The evidence presented 
by the State against Mr. Dunn failed to establish the requisite 
elements of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State admitted that Scott was the triggerman and contended 
only that Mr. Dunn was guilty as an accomplice. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-202 defines an accomplice as a "person, acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of an offense . . . who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense . . . ." 
Thus, to convict Mr. Dunn of second degree murder and aggravated 
kidnapping, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Dunn "intentionally and knowingly" assisted in the 
commission of those crimes. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 and 76-5-
302 (1978). The State was also required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of compulsion, the affirmative defense 
raised by Mr. Dunn. State v. Starks, 627 P. 2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981). 
The evidence adduced by the State on its case-in-chief against 
Mr. Dunn was entirely circumstantial. While a conviction based 
solely on circumstantial evidence may be sustained, State v. 
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 724-25 (Utah 1982), the evidence supporting 
such a conviction must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence. State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); State v. 
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Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). The evidence presented on 
the State's case-in-chief against Mr. Dunn failed to exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 
The primary evidence of any complicity by Mr. Dunn in the 
crime was his mere presence in the motorhome. That evidence showed 
only that Mr. Dunn was driving the motorhome at the time Mr. 
Sprinkle was shot by Scott. Mere presence during the commission 
of a crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an accomplice. 
A person's mere presence, even with the knowledge that a crime is 
about to be committed, does not make the person an accomplice 
unless the person has an intent to join in the crime and advises, 
encourages, or assists in the perpetration of the crime. State v. 
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 
794, 797 (Utah 1977); State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662, 
665 (1972). 
Other than Mr. Dunn's presence while driving the motorhome 
during the shooting of Mr. Sprinkle, the only evidence adduced by 
the State on its case-in-chief connecting Mr. Dunn to the crime was 
Scott's statement to the police that the gun used to kill Sprinkle 
belonged to Mr. Dunn and the unspent .25 calibre bullets found in 
a duffle bag identified as belonging to Mr. Dunn. That 
circumstantial evidence, however, was insufficient to establish 
that Mr. Dunn "voluntarily and knowingly" assisted in the 
commission of either second degree murder or aggravated kidnapping. 
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Possession of a gun and ammunition that was later used by another 
to commit a crime certainly does not establish specific intent to 
assist in the commission of that crime. Possession of a weapon may 
evidence only an intent to protect oneself. Nor would the fact 
that Scott obtained possession of a gun belonging to Mr. Dunn 
establish such an intent by Mr. Dunn. Clearly, Scott could have 
obtained the gun other than by Mr. Dunn's voluntary act or without 
Mr. Dunn? s knowledge or intention that the gun would be used to 
commit a crime. 
Moreover, as Scott's later rebuttal testimony clearly 
demonstrated, any statement by Scott was so inherently unbelievable 
that reasonable minds could not rely on it to find Mr. Dunn guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Scott made numerous inconsistent 
statements on numerous different occasions about the crime, some 
of which purported to implicate Mr. Dunn and others which 
exculpated him. T. 309-315, 395-96, 481-83, 497-510. The State's 
own recognition of the unreliability of any of these statements is 
shown by its failure to call Scott as a witness on its case-in-
chief despite the weakness of its case against Mr. Dunn and the 
existence of the recorded statement recently taken from Scott in 
exchange for his guilty plea. In arguing to the jury that Scott 
"would tell a lie any time to make him look good," T. 556, the 
State conceded that no statement of Scott could reasonably be 
relied upon as evidence of Mr. Dunn's guilt. 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, as shown below, evidence of the bullets should have 
been suppressed. Without that evidence, reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Dunn's guilt. 
Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction • 
of Mr. Dunn beyond a reasonable doubt on the charges of second 
degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. Those convictions must 
therefore be reversed. € 
IV. THE SEARCH OF MR. DUNN'S DUFFLE BAG VIOLATED THE U.S. AND 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONS AND EVIDENCE FOUND AS A RESULT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
The State's case-in-chief against Mr. Dunn rested entirely on € 
circumstantial evidence. The evidence showed that the victim died 
as a result of two gunshot wounds, and that Mr. Dunn's co-
defendant, Scott, fired the murder weapon. T. 494. Mr. Dunn was I 
linked to the crime only through his presence in the motorhome, 
Scott's unreliable statement that the murder weapon belonged to Mr. 
Dunn, and by a bag of bullets found in a duffle bag identified by 4 
its contents as belonging to Mr. Dunn. The bullets and contents 
of the duffle bag should have been suppressed. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches and seizures i 
are per se unreasonable unless they fall within narrowly defined 
exceptions. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758-60 (1979). To 
be valid, the search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag must have been 1 
undertaken either pursuant to a valid search warrant or in 
circumstances falling within an exception to the warrant 
i 
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requirement. The search, however, was neither pursuant to warrant 
nor within any exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the 
evidence found in the search should have been suppressed. 
A. The Search Of The Duffle Bag Was Warrantless 
As described above, shortly after his arrest, Mr. Dunn 
informed Officer Page that he needed prescription medicine, T. 280, 
and described the duffle bag in which the medicine was located. 
Officer Page located the duffle bag while searching the motorhome, 
but did not search the bag or remove the medicine from the bag at 
that time. T. 280-81. Instead, Officer Page brought the bag to 
the police station, where it was searched at a later time. T. 280-
84. 
The search of Mr. Dunn's bag did not fall within the ambit of 
the search warrant, as the warrant obtained covered only the 
motorhome. The execution of a search warrant is limited to the 
specific places described in the warrant and does not extend to 
additional or different places. United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 
1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert, denied sub nom., Hubbard v. 
United States, 456 U.S. 926 (1982). The search warrant allowed 
officers to search the motorhome and its contents, but once 
property was removed from the premises specified in the warrant, 
later searches of the removed property fell outside the warrant. 
Taking the bag away from the premises specified within the warrant 
removed the power and protection of the search warrant. 
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B. The Search Of The Duffle Bag Was Not Incident To Mr. 
Dunnf s Arrest 
Because the search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag was not pursuant 
to a valid warrant, to be upheld it must fall within one of the 
narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. A 
warrantless search incident to an arrest may be permissible where 
officers search the arrestee's person and the area "within his 
immediate control." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 
(1977). These searches have been held necessary to safeguard the 
arresting officer and to prevent evidence from being concealed or 
destroyed. This exception has been strictly limited to 
circumstances where necessary to achieve these aims. The "incident 
to arrest" exception will not justify warrantless searches of 
luggage or other property where the search of that property is 
remote in time or place from the arrest, Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15, 
or where the property is in the control and custody of the police 
and the threat of injury or destruction of evidence therefore no 
longer exists. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) 
(search of defendant's car after he had been arrested, searched and 
taken to police headquarters held improper). 
The search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag cannot be justified under 
the "incident to arrest" exception. The search was removed in time 
and space from the arrest and, at the time of the search, Mr. 
Dunn's bag was in the control and custody of the police. At the 
time of the search, Mr. Dunn no longer had access to his bag and 
26 
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the search was not necessary for the protection of officers or 
evidence. 
C. The Search Of The Duffle Bag Was Not A Valid Inventory 
Search 
Warrantless searches also may be allowed where subsequent to 
an arrest officers have in their custody property of an arrestee 
and seek to inventory its contents to protect an arrestee's 
property and to protect police from danger and accusations of theft 
or loss. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). However, an 
inventory search does not give officers unlimited authority to 
search all personal effects of an arrestee, nor can they be used 
as a subterfuge for police investigation. 1x3. at 372. Permissible 
inventory searches of closed containers are limited to those cases 
where the police are acting under specific guidelines. _Id. at 374 
n.6. "We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court found that 
the Police Department's procedures mandated the opening of closed 
containers and the listing of their contents. Our decisions have 
always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted 
according to standardized criteria." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals described this requirement in State 
v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 427-28 (Utah App. 1988). 
"We read Bertine to establish that the Fourth 
Amendment ijs violated if closed containers are 
opened during a vehicle search in the absence 
of a standardized, specific procedure 
mandating their opening . . . . [S]uch a 
procedure insulates police from the claim 
that, in a particular case, their opening 
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closed containers was nothing more than a % 
'fishing expedition.1" 
The testimony of Deputy Page, the officer conducting the 
search, demonstrates that the search was not part of a standardized 
inventory, but rather a search for evidence. "I was searching for 
certain items there and anything that was contained in the 
motorhome, I had the right to go into." T. 280. Deputy Page's 
1 
search of the duffle bag was, in fact, a "fishing expedition." 
Thus, the search of Mr. Dunn's bag was not a permissible inventory 
search. 
D. Mr. Dunn Did Not Consent To The Search Of The Duffle Bag 
Warrantless searches may be permissible with consent. 
However, "[w]hen a prosecutor who seeks to rely upon consent to 
I 
justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving 
that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given." 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). "'The 
4 
existence of consent is not lightly to be inferred, ' and the 
government 'always bears the burden of proof to establish the 
existence of effective consent.'" United States v. Shaibu, 895 
i 
F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, courts must indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights, including the right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 464 (1938). The State's burden is greater where consent is 
i 
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claimed to have been given while the defendant is under arrest. 
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. 1951). 
Here, Mr. Dunn was in police custody and had a medical 
condition for which he needed prescription medicine. The medicine 
was in his duffle bag, which was also in police custody. Under the 
circumstances, Mr. Dunn had no choice but to request his jailers 
to retrieve his medicine for him, and proof of that request alone 
does not satisfy the State's burden of showing "free and voluntary" 
consent to a search of the duffle bag. "Where there is coercion 
there cannot be consent." Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 
548. 
Furthermore, the scope of a search must be limited to the 
actual consent given. United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 
(10th Cir. 1985). "Consent to search a specific area limits the 
reasonableness of the search to that area. Any police activity 
that transcends the actual scope of the consent given encroaches 
on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect." Id. Here, the 
State failed to establish that the scope of any consent given by 
Mr. Dunn reached all of the contents of his duffle bag. In fact, 
Mr. Dunn had instructed the police that his medicine was in the 
bottom of the duffle bag. P. 121. Instead of simply looking for 
Mr. Dunn's medicine at the bottom of the bag, the officers went 
through the bag item by item. T. 280-84. The officers did not 
look for Mr. Dunn? s medicine at the time he asked for it, but 
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instead set the bag aside to be searched later. At most, any 
consent by Mr. Dunn gave the police a limited right to be in his 
bag; it did not authorize a wholesale search of the bagfs contents. 
E. The Bullets Were Not In Plain View 
The "plain view" doctrine allows police seizure of private 
property where three requirements are met: first, the officer must 
have a prior justification for the intrusion into the property 
where the evidence was found; second, the officer must discover the 
evidence inadvertently; and third, the nature of the evidence must 
be either "immediately apparent" or there must be "probable cause 
to associate the property with criminal activity." Texas v. Brown, 
460 U.S. 730, 737-742 (1983); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 465-469 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1071). The 
government has the burden of proving that each of these three 
requirements are met. United States v. Rutkowski, 877 F.2d 139, 
141 (1st Cir. 1989). Here, the State failed to adduce evidence on 
the suppression motion establishing that the requirements of the 
plain view doctrine were met. 
As demonstrated by the record, the discovery of the evidence 
contained in the duffle bag clearly was not inadvertent. Deputy 
Page, the officer conducting the search, testified as follows: 
A: No. We went ahead with the search 
warrant and then when I got ready to 
leave I just picked up the duffle 
bag which I had a right to go 
through at that time but I didn't go 
through it, because I did my other 
photographing and everything and 
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just brought the duffle bag back to 
the Sheriff's Office. 
Q: Now, you say, you had the right to 
go through the duffle bag. Now, of 
course, that's what we're deciding. 
What made you think you had that 
right? 
A: Anything -- I was searching for 
certain items in there and anything 
that was contained within the 
motorhome, I had the right to go 
into. 
T. 280. 
This testimony clearly shows that the police were searching 
the entire bag and therefore the discovery of the evidence in the 
bag was not inadvertent. 
Nor did the State establish that the nature of the evidence 
discovered in the search of the duffle bag was "immediately 
apparent." Certainly, the bullets were not immediately apparent 
or, indeed, apparent at all to the police. Again, Mr. Dunn had 
instructed the police that his medicine was in the bottom of the 
duffle bag. P. 121. Deputy Page testified that one of the first 
items he found in the duffle bag was a small blue bank bag. 
T. 296. Instead of setting the bank bag aside and going to the 
bottom of the duffle bag to search for Mr. Dunn's medicine, he 
opened the bank bag, in which there were toiletry articles and a 
small red bag closed with a drawstring. ^d. Only upon opening 
the small red bag did he find the bullets. .Id. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has made clear: 
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• 
the extension of the original justification is 4 
legitimate only where it is immediately 
apparent to the police that they have evidence 
before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not 
be used to extend general exploratory search 
from one object to another until something 
incriminating at last emerges. 4 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. 
While the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge was 
modified somewhat in Texas v. Brown, the Court continues to require € 
that there be probable cause to associate the property with 
criminal activity. 460 U.S. at 741-42. Here, the officers did not 
have probable cause to associate the property in plain view - - a 4 
small blue bank bag containing toiletry items -- with criminal 
activity, as required by Texas v. Brown. Indeed, Deputy Page had 
to open not only the blue bag to discover the bullets. He had to I 
open a second smaller red bag which also gave no clue as to its 
contents. 
F. The Search Of The Duffle Bag Violated The Utah 4 
Constitution 
The search of the duffle bag was improper under the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. But it also violated 
i 
Mr. Dunn's rights under Article 1, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. This Court has indicated that in some circumstances, 
the rules governing permissible searches and seizures under the 
Utah Constitution provide more protection than those under the 
United States Constitution. State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460, 469 
i 
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(Utah 1990 ). 5 In Larocco, this Court indicated that once a court 
finds that a privacy interest exists, "warrantless searches will 
be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely, to protect the safety of police or the 
public or to prevent the destruction of evidence," .Ld. at 469-70. 
Mr. Dunn clearly had a privacy interest in his duffle bag. The 
search conducted by Deputy Page was not to protect the safety of 
police since it was not conducted at the time of the arrests or 
even when the motorhome was searched pursuant to the warrant. 
Instead, the duffle bag was searched later, at the police station. 
Neither did the search serve the purpose of preventing the 
destruction of evidence. The officers were not in the process of 
conducting an inventory of the bag, and they could have protected 
the contents of the bag simply by securing it. The officers were 
not acting with the intent of securing the contents of the bag, 
rather, they were searching the bag in the hope of finding 
evidence. 
Thus, there were no "exigent circumstances" justifying the 
warrantless search of the duffle bag, Larocco, 794 P. 2d at 470, and 
the evidence should have been suppressed under the Utah as well as 
the United States Constitution. Id. at 473. 
5See also, K. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure 
Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
(unpublished manuscript attached as Addendum C). 
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G. The Denial of the Motion to Suppress Was Reversible Error 
Mr. Dunn's conviction rested primarily on circumstantial 
evidence linking him to the crime. By attributing ownership and 
control of the bullets and, therefore, inferentially, the murder € 
weapon to Mr. Dunn, the State strengthened considerably the alleged 
link between Mr. Dunn and the crime. Without this evidence, it is 
reasonably probable that the outcome of the case would have been € 
different. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 30, reversal is required where "a review 
of the record persuades the court that without the error there was • 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987), 
quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984). Here I 
the bag of bullets was one of only two items of physical evidence 
tying Mr. Dunn to the crime. The link between Mr. Dunn and the 
other item, the gun, was established only through the unreliable I 
testimony of Scott. As a result, it is far more than reasonably 
likely that the bullets played a significant role in the juryTs 
decision to convict. Thus, the trial court's refusal to suppress I 
the contents of the duffle bag constituted reversible error. 
V. THE ADMISSION OF A GRUESOME COLOR CLOSEUP OF THE CORPSE OF 
THE VICTIM WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The trial court received in evidence over defense counsel!s 
objection a closeup photograph of Sprinkle's corpse on the floor 
of the bathroom of the motorhome. T. 227-28, 299-300. The 
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photograph, which was in color, shows the corpse bent into an 
unnatural position next to the toilet, which is smeared with blood. 
The victim's shirt is pulled up, partially baring his back, which 
appears to be scratched and also smeared with blood. The victim's 
clothing is soaked with blood from the two gunshot wounds. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which was in effect at 
the time of Mr. Dunn's trial, provides that a "judge may in his 
discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will 
. . . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice . . . ." 
Rule 45 was superseded in 1983 by Utah R. Evid. 403, which is 
"substantively identical" to its predecessor. State v. Cloud, 722 
P. 2d 750, 752 n. 1 (Utah 1986). In interpreting Rule 403, this 
Court has stated: 
Although the rule's language seems to 
require a simple balancing of probative value 
and potential for unfair prejudice, our past 
decisions have recognized that inherent in 
certain categories of relevant evidence is an 
unusually strong propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury. 
Evidence in these categories is uniquely 
subject to being used to distort the 
deliberative process and improperly skew the 
outcome. Consequently, when evidence falling 
within such a category is offered, we have 
required a showing of unusual probative value 
before it is admissible under rule 403. In 
the absence of such a showing, the probative 
value of such evidence is presumed to be 
"substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice." 
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State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988), affTd, State 
v, Lafferty, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). One such 
category of evidence is "gruesome photographs of a homicide 
victim's corpse." Id.. "Gruesome photographs will often be 
excluded because the required showing of unusual probativeness 
cannot be made. This is because there is no legitimate need for 
the gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse that 
prosecutor's usually seek to introduce." Id., at 1256-57. 
The photograph at issue here should have been excluded from 
evidence under Rule 45. The photograph not only had no "unusual 
probative value," it was completely irrelevant to any issue in 
dispute at trial. The State conceded that Scott had shot Sprinkle 
and that Mr. Dunn had done nothing to physically strike the victim. 
T. 230, 305. The State's own evidence showed that Mr. Dunn was 
driving the motorhome at the time Sprinkle was shot and stuffed 
into the bathroom of the motorhome. T. 250-62. The facts that 
Scott had shot Sprinkle and shoved him into the bathroom were 
undisputed by Mr. Dunn. 
In addition, any relevant facts established by the photograph 
were (or certainly could have been) established by other means, 
i.e., through the testimony of the law enforcement officers and the 
medical examiner. 
An important consideration in assessing the 
probative value of a photograph is whether the 
facts shown by the photograph can be 
established by other means. In Garcia, [T]his 
court stated that the introduction of 
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potentially prejudicial photographs of a 
corpse is generally inappropriate if "the only 
relevant evidence they convey can be put 
before the jury readily and accurately by 
other means not accompanied by the potential 
prejudice." 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257, quoting State v. Garcia, 663 
P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 1983). Thus, the photograph here clearly had no 
unusual probative value. 
In State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah 1986), this 
Court made clear that absent a showing of unusual probative, or 
"essential evidentiary" value, photographs depicting crime scenes 
and victims' injuries are presumptively unfairly prejudicial and 
should not be admitted into evidence. "Only after a determination 
has been made that the photographs have such value need the 
weighing be made." Idl. at 753. Here, the photographs had no 
unusual probative value and therefore should have been excluded 
without the necessity of a balancing analysis. Nevertheless, many 
of the factors relevant to the balancing analysis also favor 
exclusion of the photograph at issue here. Those factors include 
whether the photographs are in color or black 
and white, when they were taken in relation to 
the crime, whether they are closeups or 
enlargements, their degree of gruesomeness, 
the cumulative nature of the evidence, and 
whether facts shown are disputed by the 
defendant. 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988). 
Given the weakness of the State's evidence against Mr. Dunn, 
the trial court's erroneous admission of the photograph was not 
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harmless. The photograph allowed the State to emphasize the 
loathsomeness of acts concededly committed by Scott, deflecting 
the jury's attention from the central issue of Mr. Dunn's 
involvement and culpability. The State adduced scant evidence of 
Mr. Dunn's involvement, all of which was circumstantial except for 
the testimony of Scott who, as stated by the prosecutor, "would 
tell a lie anytime to make him look good." T. 556. Under these 
circumstances, there can be no confidence that the jury was not 
unduly influenced by the photograph. Mr. Dunn's conviction should 
therefore be reversed and a new trial should be granted. 
VI. MR. DUNN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
TRIAL 
The constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel6 encompasses 
the right to effective assistance of counsel during a criminal 
trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel is demonstrated where a 
defendant shows: 
[First] that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable. 
6
 Art. 1, § 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees an 
accused's right to counsel. The Utah provision guarantees as much 
protection as the Sixth Amendment, and possibly more. The Utah 
Constitution provides an independent basis for the relief requested 
here. 
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State v. Archuleta, 747 P. 2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987), quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), reh'g denied, 
Strickland v. Washington, 467 U.S. 1267. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel substantially prejudiced Mr. 
Dunn's defense.7 Counsel failed to request two instructions 
critical to Mr. Dunn's defense. Absent these errors, there is a 
probability that the results of Mr. Dunn's trial and appeal would 
have been different sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023. 
Failure to request a jury instruction can constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Moritzsky, 771 P. 2d 
688 (Utah App. 1989). In Moritzsky, the Court of Appeals found 
ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel failed to 
request the appropriate defense of habitation instruction. The 
court held that the defendant was entitled to the defense of 
habitation instruction and that there was "no conceivable tactical 
basis for this omission." Id. at 692. In addition, the court 
found that the defendant was prejudiced by the omission and that 
there was "a reasonable probability that the juryTs verdict would 
have been more favorable to defendant had the proper instruction 
been given." Ld. at 693. 
7This Court has already held that Mr. Dunn's counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance on his first appeal. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P. 2d 
873, 878 (Utah 1990). 
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Both of the elements of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
present here. "[C]ounsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner and . . . !a reasonable probability exists that 
except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been 
different.™ State v. Crestani, 771 P. 2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989) 
quoting State v. Verdi, 770 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989). 
A. Failure To Request An Instruction Regarding 
Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony Constituted 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel. 
The only evidence to support Mr. Dunn's liability as an 
accomplice was the testimony of co-defendant, Scott, the 
triggerman. Scott testified that Mr. Dunn participated with Scott 
in assaulting, binding and shooting the victim. Scott's testimony 
that Mr. Dunn was his accomplice was not corroborated by any other 
witness or direct evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1982) 
explains the proper treatment of uncorroborated accomplice 
testimony: 
a. A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice. 
b. In the discretion of the court, an instruction to 
the jury may be given to the effect that such 
uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with 
caution and such an instruction shall be given if 
the trial judge finds the testimony of the 
accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable.8 
8Section 77-17-7 took effect on July 1, 1980 and applied to 
Mr. Dunn's trial which began on December 30, 1980. 1980 Utah Laws, 
ch. 15 § 2. 
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Under the similar federal rule, the Tenth Circuit has held that 
failure to give a cautionary instruction regarding uncorroborated 
accomplice testimony constitutes plain error. United States v. 
Hill, 627 F.2d 1052, 1053 (10th Cir. 1980). A general instruction 
regarding the credibility of witnesses is insufficient to inform 
the jury how to use uncorroborated accomplice testimony properly. 
Id. at 1054. "[l]f the testimony of an accomplice is 
uncorroborated, 'the court must instruct the jury that testimony 
of accomplices must be carefully scrutinized, weighed with great 
care, and received with caution.'" Id. at 1053, quoting United 
States v. Birmingham, 447 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Scottfs testimony was uncorroborated, self-contradictory and 
improbable. Indeed, even the prosecutor called Scott a liar. 
T. 556. Section 77-17-7 clearly applied. However, defense counsel 
failed to request, and the trial court did not give, any 
instruction which cautioned the jury to "carefully scrutinize," and 
"weigh with great care," or "receive with caution" Scott's 
uncorroborated testimony. The only instructions given regarding 
the credibility of witnesses were in insufficiently general terms. 
Hill, 627 F.2d at 1054. A specific cautionary instruction was 
critical to maintain the fundamental fairness of the trial. 
Counsel's failure to request the instruction was not within the 
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 
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But for counselfs error, there is a reasonable probability 
that the jury would not have found Mr. Dunn guilty as an 
accomplice. The only direct evidence supporting the prosecution's 
argument for accomplice liability was the testimony of Scott. The 
lack of a cautionary instruction left the jury unaware of the 
significance of Scott's bias and interest, which would have 
substantially detracted from his credibility as a witness. Failure 
to request an instruction or to object to the court's failure to 
give one, was reversible error, substantially prejudiced Mr. Dunn's 
case and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. Failure To Request An Appropriate Instruction 
On The Defense Of Compulsion Constituted 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Defense counsel's failure to request an appropriate 
instruction on Mr. Dunn's defense of compulsion also constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Dunn testified that, at the 
time the crimes were committed, he was acting under compulsion and 
therefore was not criminally liable for his conduct. T. 435-36. 
Compulsion is an affirmative defense to crimes against the person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (1978). The prosecution carries the 
burden to prove the absence of evidence supporting an affirmative 
defense. State v. Pur ant, 674 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1983). 
"Clearly, a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion in 
presenting an affirmative defense. . . . The defendant's evidence 
need only raise a reasonable doubt as to any element of the crime 
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to justify an acquittal," State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 
1981). 
In State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 429 (Utah 1986), this Court 
held that an instruction on an affirmative defense which does not 
explain the prosecution's burden of proof is improper because it 
may well raise the inference that the burden 
is on the defendant. The proper course would 
be for the court to explicitly state that the 
defendant has no particular burden of proof on 
the issue of withdrawal and that the question 
is whether, taking all the evidence on the 
issue into account, the state has shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant has not 
withdrawn from the commission of the offense 
and that he is guilty of the offense charged. 
In this case, the trial court's instruction on the defense of 
compulsion was error. Defense counsel and the prosecution each 
submitted virtually identical instructions on compulsion. The 
court gave the instruction as requested by the State, Instruction 
No. 30, which reads as follows: 
Under the law, an accused person is not guilty 
of an offense if he is engaged in the 
proscribed conduct because he was coerced to 
do so by use or threatened imminent use of 
unlawful physical force upon him, which force 
or threatened force a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would not have 
resisted. 
The defense of compulsion provided by 
this section shall be unavailable to the 
person who intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly places himself in a situation in 
which it is probable that he will be subjected 
to duress. 
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If you find under all of the facts of 
this case that the defendant was coerced as 
herein defined, you must find him not guilty. 
T. 554; Addendum B. 
Noticeably absent from Instruction No. 30 is any discussion 
of the burden of proof. This was the only affirmative defense 
instructed upon at Mr. Dunn's trial. The instruction given for 
each substantive offense explained that the prosecution has the 
burden of proving each element of that offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The absence of any burden of proof explanation in 
Instruction No. 30 impermissibly allowed the jury to infer that Mr. 
Dunn had the burden of proving his affirmative defense. 
Instruction No. 30 was reversible error. 
Reasonably competent counsel would have requested, and 
objected to the court's failure to give, a compulsion instruction 
which clearly explained that the prosecution must disprove the 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant carries 
no burden of persuasion. The crux of Mr. Dunn's defense was that 
he did not willingly participate in the crimes. He testified that 
Scott ordered him to keep quiet and threatened him with a gun. 
T. 464. A proper compulsion instruction was vital to Mr. Dunn's 
case. It is reasonably probable that with a proper compulsion 
instruction the jury would have found that the prosecution did not 
carry its burden of proof and that Mr. Dunn's evidence raised a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Therefore, the failure to 
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request an appropriate instruction on the defense of compulsion was 
reversible error and constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and, 
thus, the conviction should be reversed. At the very least, a new 
trial is required. The prosecutorfs prejudicial remarks during 
closing argument, the improper admission of Mr. Dunn's prior 
conviction, the erroneous admission of the bullets, the improper 
admission of the photograph, and the failure of Mr. Dunn's counsel 
to request critical jury instructions is each, taken alone, 
sufficiently prejudicial to undermine confidence in the conviction 
given the weakness and circumstantial nature of the State's 
evidence against Mr. Dunn. The cumulative effect of those errors 
leaves no question that Mr. Dunn was deprived of a fair trial and 
that, at a minimum, a new trial is mandated. State v. Rammel, 721 
P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986); State v. Coe, 684 P.2d 668, 678 
(Wash. 1984); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 743 (Wyo. 1986). 
DATED this J7^day of November, 1990. 
WATK^S & SAPERSTEIN 
David B. Vfyatkiss 
Debra J. Moore 
Mary J. Woodhead 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that four copies of the attached BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT ROBERT W. DUNN was caused to be served upon: 
Paul R. Van Dam 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
by hand delivery this 5**~ day of November, 1990. 
C • /k^^a^i 
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R. Don Brow til JAIJ 19 PH ft: kS 
Sevier County Attorney 
County Courthouse •.LWUPJULSCN.CLCF::? 
Richfield, Utah 84701 :"2264*7MU*Z~Tri 
Telephone: (801) 896-6812 $> j£Un' 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF 1 
vs. 
ROBERT W. 
UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
DUNN 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
* 
> • 
: 
: 
» • 
JUDGMENT 
Criminal No. 789 
The above-captioned matter having come before the 
Court on the 14th day of January, 1981 for sentencing, and 
the Court having entertained the arguments of R. Don Brown, 
Sevier County Attorney, representing the State of Utah; Marcus 
Taylor, attorney for the Defendant, and having heard from 
the Defendant personally and being apprised of no further 
impediment to sentencing % 
NOW THEREFORE regarding Count I for which the 
jury returned a verdict of Guilty of Murder in the Second 
Degree, a First Degree Felony, the Defendant is sentenced 
to serve a term in the Utah State Prison of 5 years to life; 
With regard to Count II for which the jury returned 
a verdict of Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping, a Capital Felony, 
and for which the jury was unable to agree as to the sentence 
to be imposed, the Count, on the 6th day of January, ordered 
the Defendant to serve a prison term of life at the Utah 
State Prison; such sentence to be served concurrently with 
the sentence for Count I. 
The Prison Officials are advised that the Defendant 
is apprehensive Acrfffhis life^S^a^sult of threats received. 
DAJEITthia^Uth day of JanuarK 1981. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. jd 
Under the law, an accused person is not guilty 
of an offense if he engaged in the proscribed conduct because 
he was coerced to do so by u^e or threatened imminent use 
of unlawful physical force upon him, which force or threatened 
force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would 
not have resisted. 
The defense of compulsion provided by this section 
i 
shall be unavailable to the person who intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is 
probable that he will be subjected to duress. 
If you find under all of the facts of this case 
that the Defendant was coerced as herein defined, you must 
find him not guilty. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Heeding the Call: 
Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under 
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
Kenneth R. Wallentine* 
Any defense lawyer who fails to raise [state 
constitutional arguments] and relies solely on parallel 
provisions under the federal constitution . . . should 
be guilty of legal malpractice.1 
This bold statement, by Justice Robert E. Jones of the Oregon 
Supreme Court, is echoed by the justices and judges of Utah 
courts.2 Despite numerous and explicit invitations to brief Utah 
constitutional provisions,3 and a demonstrated willingness to reach 
state constitutional questions,4 practitioners "continue to ignore"5 
* Kenneth R. Wallentine is a member of the Utah Bar and is 
employed at the Utah Court of Appeals. The author wishes to thank 
the Hon. Christine M. Durham for her editorial suggestions, and 
Tracey Panek for research contributions. 
1. State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 365, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 
(1983)(Jones, J., concurring). 
2. See, e.g.. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) ("it 
is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state 
constitutional questions"). While this article is necessarily 
confined to discussion of Utah's constitution, the analytical 
models and source material cited may be applied equally to any 
state constitution. 
3. See generally, Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution, 2 Utah 
B.J. 25 (Nov. 1989). 
4. See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State 
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 
(Utah 1986) (Durham, J., concurring on Utah constitution, article 
I & V grounds); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) 
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the courts' admonitions. This delinquency hinders development of 
Utah constitutional law. The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court 
of Appeals have noted that they will limit their constitutional 
analysis to the theories presented and briefed.6 
One wonders how the bar can so cavalierly reject direction by 
the state's supreme court. Perhaps, upon reconsideration, this 
failure is duef not to an attitude of indifference, rather to 
ignorance. At a recent seminar, a prosecutor from a large 
metropolitan county attorney's office called upon the speaker, a 
justice of the Utah Supreme Court, to promulgate a consistent model 
of state constitutional analysis, complaining that attorneys did 
not know what the court wanted.7 To be sure, the responsibility 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting); State v. Hygh, 711 
P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); American 
Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985) (Durham, J., for 
the majority, relies upon state constitution's self-incrimination 
provision, articles I & XII; Zimmerman, J., concurring suggests an 
article I, section 14 analysis). 
5. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). 
6. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988). See 
also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1257 n.2 (Utah 1987) ; State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-6 (Utah 1986); cf. State v. Hygh 711 P.2d 
264, 271-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (arguments for 
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions should 
be considered if made) ; <MMHfcWP>^EBNEM M |BMd^ 
^ ^ ^ 0 l ^ f e l W i M I H W H V P H H P f M M 9 9 ) ; State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
326 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (casual references to the state 
constitution are insufficient to require state constitutional 
analysis). 
7. The question was posed at the Seventh Annual Conference on 
State and Local Government, Government and Legal Politics Society, 
J. Reuben Clark Law School. Justice Christine Durham of the Utah 
Supreme Court graciously invited the attorney to become familiar 
with state constitutional argument. 
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for educating this prosecutor and his colleagues in state 
constitutional analysis rests primarily with them and not the 
courts. Much of the blame must lie with our nation's law schools. 
Many scholars and judges have lamented the substantial bias toward 
federal constitutional law taught in law schools.8 Utah's two 
schools have only just initiated courses in state constitutional 
law,9 despite an invitation to do so nearly a decade ago.10 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution11 guarantees 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, paralleling the 
language of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Until recently, the Utah Supreme Court and other Utah courts have 
8. Douglas, State Judicial Activism — The New Role for State 
Bills of Rights. 12 Suffolk L. Rev. 1147 (1978). Douglas is a 
justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire and has decried the 
federal bias carried by state court judges' law clerks, inculcated 
in "federally oriented law schools." He also laments the lack of 
textual materials for courses in state constitutional law. The 
first, and only, text for state constitutional studies was 
published in late 1988. Williams, State Constitutional Lav, Cases 
and Materials, ACIS (1988). 
9. At the J. Reuben Clark Law School a course in state 
constitutional law was taught for the first time in Winter 1990, 
although many state constitutional issues had been explored in 
state government classes in preceding years by Professor Eugene B. 
Jacobs. At the University of Utah, Justice Christine Durham 
teaches a seminar in state constitutional law, also begun this 
year. 
10. See Fordham, Some Observations Upon Uneasy American 
Federalism. 58 N.C. L. Rev. 293 (1980). 
11. Article I, § 14 provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
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faithfully followed federal court interpretations of the fourth 
amendment in construing the protections of article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution.12 Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
only two years ago that it had "never drawn distinctions between 
the protections afforded by the respective constitutional 
provisions. Ratherf the [c]ourt has always considered the 
protections afforded to be one and the same."13 However, in the 
same breath the court hastened to state that "choosing to give the 
Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to 
be an appropriate method for insulating the state's citizens from 
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts."14 Earlier this year, in State v. 
Larocco,15 the Utah Supreme Court announced that the court would 
eliminate certain exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant 
requirement in favor of a simpler test under article lf section 
12. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389-92 (Utah 1986). 
13. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Zimmerman notes that this statement is 
mere dictum and stands squarely at odds with the intent of footnote 
number 8 in the majority opinion. 
14. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted). See also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 104 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (Billings, J., dissenting) ("[s]tate courts responding 
to the confusing and restrictive new federal interpretations are 
relying on an analysis of their own search and seizure provisions 
to expand constitutional protection beyond those mandated by the 
fourth amendment, often directly avoiding applicable United States 
Supreme Court precedent"). 
15. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
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14.16 The New York Court of Appeals has stated a similar 
justification in departing from a uniform construction of identical 
search and seizure language, commenting that M[fjourth [a]mendment 
rules governing police conduct have been muddied, and judicial 
supervision of the warrant process diluted."17 
Members of the Utah bar must go forward with their state 
constitutional law educations and respond to judicial invitations. 
Professor Hans Linde, former chief justice of the Oregon Supreme 
Court and a noted writer on state constitutional analysis, has 
stated that "independent argument under the state [constitution] 
takes homework — in texts, in history, in alternative approaches 
to analysis. It is not enough to ask the state court to reject a 
[United States] Supreme Court opinion on a comparable federal 
clause merely because one prefers the opposite result."13 It is the 
intent of this article to demonstrate how attorneys may 
successfully brief search and seizure issues under the Utah 
constitution.19 Part I discusses methods of state constitutional 
16. Id. at 469-70. The court, speaking through Justice Durham, 
held that it would first apply the expectation of privacy concept 
as a "threshold criterion for determining whether article l, 
section 14 is applicable." Id. at 469. If applicable, the court 
would then determine whether the challenged search could be 
justified by safety concerns or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence. 
17. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 
501 N.E.2d 556, 562 (1986). 
18. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States1 Bills 
of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379, 392 (1980). 
19. While this article focuses on the unique historical, social 
and legal factors impacting on a search and seizure analysis under 
the Utah Constitution, the approach is equally adaptable to 
5 
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research and provides a brief introduction to theories of state 
constitutional interpretation. Part II introduces historical 
considerations impacting on Utah search and seizure analysis. 
Finally, Part III compares analysis of article I, section 14 of the 
Utah constitution with selected other state constitutions. 
I. Methods of State Constitutional Analysis 
In State v. Jewett.20 Justice Hayes of the Vermont Supreme 
Court took counsel to task for making cursory references to the 
state constitution and failing to brief such issues. Beyond this 
admonition, however, the court remanded the case with instructions 
to counsel to adequately brief state constitutional issues. 
Justice Hayes then noted that "we who have the mind to criticize 
must have the heart to help."21 With that preface, he embarked upon 
a tutorial theme for state constitutional research and argument. 
The Utah Supreme Court has embraced Justice Hayes1 instructive 
opinion. 
The Jewett court suggested the use of four principle sources 
of analytical material. First, the history of the state 
constitutional analysis under any state constitution. 
20. 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985). See also State v. Hunt, 91 
N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (Handler, J., concurring). 
21. 500 A.2d at 234. 
22. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). 
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constitution, especially legislative history, must be considered. 
Second, the textual construction of the provision should be 
analyzed.24 Third, comparison with decisions of other states' 
courts construing their state constitutional provisions of similar 
or identical language may be helpful.25 Finally, "Brandeis brief" 
sociological materials may be utilized.26 These approaches are 
considered in following sections, with their particular 
applicability to Utah's search and seizure provision. 
Of course, before reaching either federal or state 
constitutional issues an attorney should resort first to 
administrative regulations and state statute.27 The attorney must 
consider whether a challenged search violates a state statute.28 
For example, Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-15 states that a "peace 
officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions." This 
23. 500 A.2d at 236. See also, American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 
701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985) (relying on history of Utah Constitution, 
art. I, § 12). 
24. 500 A.2d at 236-37. 
25. 500 A.2d at 237. 
26. Id. 
27. See generally, Davis & Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the 
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah. 3 B.Y.U. J. 
Pub. L. 357, 359-65 (1989). 
28. See generally. State ex rel T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 
(1983), rev'd. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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statutory restraint may arguably be more stringent than the fourth 
amendment, as Utah law requires "reasonable suspicion" as a 
necessary prerequisite to making a stop.29 The fourth amendment 
does not always so require. While the United States Supreme Court 
has required "some quantum of individual suspicion" as a general 
prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure, it has ruled 
that the fourth amendment imposes no "irreducible requirement" of 
such suspicion.30 
One frequent criticism of state constitutional decisions is 
that identical provisions of a state constitution and the federal 
constitution are construed differently, causing confusion at the 
bar.31 However, the additional taxation on an advocated abilities 
ought not give cause to simplifying the rules for simplicity sake. 
It is not yet clear which analytical approach32 will be adopted as 
29. See also. State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 
(1988) (Idaho constitution requires reasonable suspicion to conduct 
a statutorily authorized sobriety enforcement roadblock). 
30. The Supreme Court has carved out a few established and well-
delineated exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement 
dealing with airport security, zoning violation enforcement, border 
control activity, frisk searches and warrantless administrative 
searches of commercial property. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Wyman 
v. James, 400 U.S. 3 09 (1971); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 
(1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
31. See, e.g. . State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 365, 667 P.2d 996, 
1012 (1983) (Jones, J., dissenting); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 
101, 119, 545 P.2d 272, 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (1976) 
(Richardson, J., dissenting). 
32. Three principle approaches have been taken in state 
constitutional analysis: the primacy model, the interstitial model 
and the dual sovereignty approach. See Utter, Swimming in the Jaws 
of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Issues When 
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the rule in Utah courts. In several instances the Utah Supreme 
Court has noted that the decision of the case comports with both 
state and federal constitutional provisions under parallel 
analysis.33 However, dicta in several opinions hints that the 
Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 Tex. L. Rev* 
1027 (1985). See also Developments in the Law—Interpretation of 
State Constitutional Rights. 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982). The 
primacy model treats the state constitution as the fundamental 
wellspring of rights. Federal decisions and their underlying 
analysis are regarded as persuasive, although not controlling, 
authority. The interstitial model first calls for analysis under 
the federal constitution; if the right claimed is guaranteed under 
the federal constitution, no further inquiry is needed. However, 
if the right is not federally-assured, the search continues in the 
state constitution for a possible source. See State v. Hunt, 91 
N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982). The dual sovereignty approach 
follows a dual analysis of state and federal constitutions, even 
when the state constitutional provision may be authoritative and 
directly resolve the issue. See State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 
A.2d 336 (1982) . The dual sovereignty approach has been criticized 
as a method of evading both state populist review, by relying on 
federal grounds, and federal review, by relying on independent and 
adequate state grounds. See Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and 
No Anchor—Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 975 (1980) . This criticism has been ably 
refuted in Utter, supra (1985). 
33. See State v. Nelson 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986) (admission 
of hearsay statements not a violation of the right to confrontation 
under either U.S. Const, amend. VI or Utah Const, art. I, § 12); 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275 (Utah 1986) (rule that 
admission of out-of-court statements under the circumstances of the 
case created no confrontation problem is the same under federal and 
state constitution); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 
1986) (interpreting in parallel fashion the speedy trial provisions 
contained in Utah Const, art. I, § 12 and U.S. Const, amend. VI); 
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 265-67 (Utah 1986) (holding that the 
"Utah and the federal cruel and unusual punishment provisions apply 
to this case in the same fashion", and equal protection analysis 
is the same under both constitutions) ; State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
267 (Utah 1985) (holding that, as under federal law, inventory 
searches are permitted by Utah Const, art. I, § 14), State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah 1984) (in the context of the 
instant case "article I, § 9 [of the Utah Constitution] does not 
give the defendant more extensive protections than those afforded 
by the eighth amendment [of the federal constitution]); State v. 
Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-06 (Utah 1984) (ineffective assistance 
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primacy model may be appropriate for Utah jurisprudence.34 While 
some may be critical of the apparent confusion,35 able members of 
the bar should take the opportunity to advocate analysis most 
favorable to their clients. 
Notwithstanding the short supply of state constitutional law 
texts, there are ample research sources applying state 
constitutional theory.36 Some limited history is available for 
of counsel analysis same under Utah Const, art. I, § 12 and U.S. 
Const, amend. VI.); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 n. 5 (Utah 
1984) cert, denied. 466 U.S. 942 ("[The Utah Supreme Court] 
recognizes no distinction between the protection against ex post 
facto laws provided by the Utah and the United States 
Constitutions"); McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 323 (Utah 1983) 
(the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. const, amend. V and of 
the Utah Const, art I. § 12 "have the same content"). 
34. See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988); State 
v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Billings, 
J., dissenting). 
35. See, Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State 
Constitution. 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319, 321. 
36. See generally. Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law. 20 
Rutgers L.J. 877 (1989); Williams, State Constitutional Law, Cases 
and Materials ACIS (1988) ; Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the 
States; The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of 
Individual Rights. 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535 (1986); Note, The Use of 
State Constitutional Provisions in Criminal Defense After Michigan 
v. Long, 65 Neb. L. Rev. 605 (1986); Developments in state 
Constitutional Theory and State Courts (B. McGraw, ed. 1985); 
Carson, "Last Things Last:'1 A Methodological Approach to Legal 
Argument in State Courts, 19 Williamette L. Rev. 641 (1983); 
Developments in the Law—Interpretation of State Constitutional 
Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982); Brennan, State Constitutions 
and the Protection of Individual Rights 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 
(1977); Note, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights. 
8 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 271 (1973). See also How to Research 
State Constitutional Law. Nat'l L. J., May 12, 1984, Special 
Insert. Additionally, the National Association of Attorneys 
General has recently inaugurated an annual journal entitled 
Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law. 
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study of the Utah Constitution, although nothing like the volumes 
treating its federal counterpart. Notwithstanding the comparative 
scarcity of material, one must remember that ,f[t]he imaginative 
lawyer is still the fountainhead of our finest jurisprudence."38 
II. A Historical Approach 
Utah's constitutions,39 seven in number, have had a contorted 
history which has not been well-documented. Utah's first 
constitution was cooked up in back rooms (not likely smoke-
filled)40 by early Mormon leaders. The Constitution of the State 
of Deseret, Utah's first constitution, published in 1849 in 
37. See, e.g., Crawley, The Constitution of the State of Deseret, 
29 B.Y.U. Studies 7 (1989); Swindler, Sources and Documents of 
United States Constitutions (1979) ; Flynn, Federalism and Viable 
State Government — The History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah 
L. Rev. 311; Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State 
Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 326; Hickman, Utah Constitutional 
Law 40 (1954) (unpublished doctoral dissertation available at the 
University of Utah Library). 
38. 500 A.2d at 237. The approaches suggested in Jewett do not 
represent the full scope of analysis. In Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 
494, 503 (Alaska 1975), the court cited the lifestyle of the 
typical Alaskan to justify broad privacy protections, see also. 
Woods & Rhode, Inc. v. State Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 
1977) (the Alaska Constitution, article 1, section 22, guarantee 
of privacy protects against warrantless administrative searches). 
39. Constitutions were drafted and submitted to Congress in 1849, 
1856, 1862, 1872, 1882, and 1887. After Utah was approved for 
admission to the Union in 1894, the official state constitution was 
approved by voters on November 5, 1895. Utah was formally admitted 
to the Union on January 4, 1896. That constitution was and remains 
the only official constitution the State of Utah. Thus, reference 
to constitutions prior to that of 1896 is to the various 
constitutions proposed by the territorial government as part of the 
ongoing efforts to gain statehood. 
40. One of the tenets of the Mormon faith requires its members to 
abstain from the use of tobacco products. 
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f 
Kanesville, Iowa, was accompanied by notes of a constitutional 
convention that were complete fabrication.41 The election of a 
I 
house of representatives and constitutional convention and records 
and annals were invented, a secret known only to early Mormon 
leaders. A plethora of inconsistencies is evident in the 
43 i 
record. A search of early Mormon diaries reveals no mention of 
any gathering or convention on the claimed dates.44 In fact, the 
"clerk" of the convention, reported that there was a "great wolf 
i 
hunt" on the opening day of the convention, but no mention of the 
convention.45 Several leaders, delegates to the convention, list 
many detailed activities in their personal diaries for the dates 
i 
of the convention — events taking them all over the valley — yet 
none mention the convention.46 The Constitution of the state of 
Deseret was based largely on the Iowa constitution of 1846.47 Its 
i 
deceitful history came to light only after nearly 140 years, with 
the historical research of a Brigham Young University scholar, who 
meticulously demonstrated that the group allegedly assembled to 
i 
41. Crawley, The Constitution of the State of Deseret. 29 B.Y.U. 
Studies 7 (1989). 
42. Id. at 12-15. 
43. See id. at 11. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 11-12. 
47. Id. at 15. 
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draft a constitution could not have been gathered at the time and 
place recorded.48 
Despite its questionable origin, the first constitution was 
well-regarded and has been termed a "model state constitution."49 
It included a provision protecting against unreasonable search and 
seizure, as did each subsequent constitution.50 Unfortunately, no 
direct legislative history is available concerning the decision to 
include this provision. The first appearance in the official 
annals is found in the report of the constitutional convention of 
1895. Article I, section 14 was mentioned only in brief passing. 
The entire record appears as follows: "The Chairman: Gentlemen, 
we will take up section 14. Section 14 was read and passed without 
amendment."51 
Utah's subsequent proposed constitutions were based on the 
Constitution of the State of Deseret, with its liberal use of the 
Iowa constitution, and textual loans from several other state 
48. Id. at 7. 
49. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government — The History 
of Utah's Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 324. Even as late 
as 1966, Flynn, a professor of law at the University of Utah, and 
others, had no clue as to the false birth of the first 
constitution. 
50. The provision protecting against unreasonable search and 
seizure was placed at the end of the Constitution of the State of 
Deseret in the eighth article. In the constitution of 1856 the 
bill of rights was placed at the beginning as article II, following 
the article which defined the proposed state boundaries. In 1862 
the boundary provision was eliminated and the declaration of rights 
became the first article, where it remained. 
51. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the 
Convention 1895, 319 (1898). 
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constitutions. New York,2 Illinois,53 Nevada54 and Washington55 
served as models for Utah constitutions. As these constitutions 
served as patterns, and early Mormon leaders were generally 
familiar with constitutional law,56 it is reasonable to consider 
the legislative history and subsequent construction of these 
constitutions. The following section compares the judicial 
decisions construing those constitutions1 search and seizure 
provisions. 
One of the analytical approaches suggested in State v. 
Jewett,57 and endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court,58 focuses on the 
52. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the 
Convention: 1895, 1066 (1898) (section 8 taken verbatim from the 
New York constitution). ^  Considering that Joseph Smith, the founder 
of Mormonism, was a long-time New York citizen and generally 
reputed to be a student of constitutional law, see infra note 56, 
the New York constitution may have been the first to be considered 
by Smith and his associates in their discussions on government. 
53. Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law 42-43 (1954). 
54. Deseret News, Feb. 28, 1872. 
55. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the 
Convention: 1895, 1067, 1108, 1125 (1898) (sections taken from the 
Washington constitution). 
56. The founding prophet of the Mormon Church, Joseph Smith, was 
a homespun constitutional scholar. Smith, Teachings of the Prophet 
Joseph Smith 326 (1940); Roberts, History of the Church, 6:57. He 
spent many hours teaching constitutional principles to his 
subordinates who later became ecclesiastical and political leaders. 
See Quinn, 20 B.Y.U. Studies 163 (1980). Smith's personal 
influence remained strong; early settlers selected his uncle, John 
Smith, as the first president of the settlement in Salt Lake 
Valley. Smith was also the Mormon patriarch, a position held to 
this day only by blood descendants of Joseph Smith. Morgan, The 
State of Deseret, 10 (U.S.U. 1987). 
57. 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985). 
58. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). 
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social history of the drafters of the state constitution. Once 
again, Utah has a distinctive history in this regard. The early 
settlers in Utah had experienced great deprivations of their civil 
liberties. Not only had they been driven from Ohiof Missouri and 
Illinois by armed mobs, but later became victims to federal 
authorities sent by Washington to maintain a firm hand on the 
territory's theocracy. Once established in the Territory of Utah, 
early Utahns were subjected to two government attempts to 
extinguish the practice of polygamy in the territory.59 One author 
commented that the Mormon's persecution lead to a "unique sentiment 
[] among the members of the Mormon Church and the state 
constitutional convention [delegates] regarding personal privacy, 
sanctity of the home, and the separate provinces of the individual 
and the state."60 
As part of the anti-polygamy enforcement, the fourth amendment 
was often forgotten by U.S. marshals, other law enforcement 
officers and courts. Early accounts tell of federal marshals who 
59. Firmage, Zion in the Courts, 129, 160 (1988). Mormons did 
not publicly confess the practice of polygamy until 1852, although 
it had been a component of Mormon society for some time. Id. at 
13 0. Firmage details two distinct periods of anti-polygamy 
legislation and enforcement. The first began as early as 1854, 
when efforts were made to disqualify polygamists from eligibility 
for homesteading. IcJ. at 131. Transition into the second period 
was signaled by passage of the Edmunds Act, 22 Stat. 30 (1882). 
With the issue of slavery settled by the Civil War, Congress was 
now free to pass a flurry of anti-polygamy legislation. Firmage 
details the impact of these measures. See id. 160-209. 
60. Panek, A Peculiar People and Their Constitution: The Culture 
and Times of 19th Century Utah, 6, unpublished manuscript in 
possession of the author. (Hereinafter "Panek") . Ms. Panek has 
conducted exhaustive research into accounts of searches by law 
enforcement officials in territorial days. 
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saw little need for the aid of search warrants.61 In an article 
entitled "How They Do It," the Deseret News described a 
I 
characteristic raid on a suspected polygamist's home: 
The deputy U.S. Marshals first appeared at the residence 
of Mr. Goff, on the east side of the river. Mrs. Goff 
met them at the door, and to their queries replied that 
her husband was not at home. They then demanded i 
admittance to the house, and Mrs. Goff inquired whether 
they were authorized to do so. To this Deputy J.W. 
Franks replied insolently that the only search warrant 
he needed was an axe with which to break in the door. 
The deputies then searched the house . . . .62 
i 
Night time searches, viewed with fastidious scrutiny by courts 
since the beginnings of the common law,63 were not uncommon and 
executed without any showing of particularized need to search at 
i 
night. Several women complained that officers would appear at any 
time of night and require them to awaken families and conduct the 
marshals through the house by lamplight.64 The nocturnal searches 
prompted public outcry, as evidenced in angry editorials. One 
Utahn asked whether "officers of the law, without resistance, or 
request for admission, and without a warrant, have a right to break 
into citizens' houses at any hour of the day or night . . . without 
61. 17 Cong. Rec. 3138 (1886). See also Firmage, Zion in the 
Courts, 227 (1988). 
62. Deseret News Weekly. Jan. 20, 1886 at 1, cited in Panek, supra 
note 60 at 6. 
63. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961); 2 Hale, Pleas 
of the Crown 113 (1847). 
64. Panek, supra note 60 at 11, 12. See also Deseret News Weekly. 
June 10, 1885 at 1. 
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having a warrant for that person[']s arrest or even knowing his 
name."65 To date, the question of standards for night time searches 
is an unsettled area of Utah law.66 
The marshals' searches were not limited to the Mormons' homes. 
Clever deputies soon figured out where most Mormons could be found 
on any given Sunday. Officers began to attend church services, but 
not to commune with their Maker. One account relates how not-so-
clever deputies were outfoxed when they entered a religious service 
intending to effect an arrest. "The whole congregation arose and 
the marshals were surrounded while two of the wanted men escaped 
through a window and got away safely."67 Other officers enjoyed 
greater success. Perhaps inspired by the Mormon practice of 
issuing calls to service in public meetings, one marshal paraded 
to the front of the church and subpoenaed men from the pulpit. As 
an amazed congregation watched, he also took two of their number 
into custody.68 
Evidence of polygamy became harder to obtain, as polygamists 
both attempted to comply with applicable laws by avoiding contact 
with their wives, and became more canny in hiding the activities 
leading to conviction. The response of the courts was to reduce 
65. Deseret News Weekly, Jan. 27, 1886 at 26, cited in Panek, 
supra note 60 at 17. 
67. Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children on the Underground. 51 Utah 
Hist. Q., 133, 142 (1983). 
68. Deseret News Weekly. May 20, 1885, at 1, cited in Panek, supra 
note 60 at 12. 
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the quantum of evidence necessary for a conviction and to offer 
a hefty bonus to deputies who arrested suspected polygamists.70 
Marshals practiced the time-honored tactic of enlisting paid 
informants. Informants also performed night time searches, without 
the benefit of warrant or commission.71 In an early gathering of 
delegates to the constitutional convention, Mormon leader B.H. 
Roberts complained that marshals "employ[ed] spies and spotters."72 
Abuses by federal officers were not limited to offensive 
searches. Women were seized and incarcerated in conditions deemed 
wretched even in that day. It was not uncommon for federal judges 
to jail mothers with their young infants.73 One tiny cell was 
shared by six women and three infants.74 
Against this background of unprecedented federal judicial 
abuse, arises a theory that the search and seizure provision in 
the Utah constitution was included as a deliberate, considered act, 
69. See United States v. Harris, 17 P. 75 (Utah 1888). 
70. Brown, The United States Marshals in Utah Territory to 1896. 
144 (unpublished thesis available in the Utah State Historical 
Society Library), cited in Panek, supra note 60 at 13. 
71. Panek, supra note 60 at 8. 
72. Mormon Protest Against Injustice. An Appeal for Constitutional 
and Religious Liberty 45, Full Report of the Mass Meeting Held in 
Salt Lake City, May 2, 1885, by John Irvine, published by Jos. 
Hyrum Parry & Co., cited in Panek, supra note 60 at 26. 
73. See, e.g.. Ex parte Harris, 5 P. 129 (Utah 1884). 
74. 19 Cong. Rec. 9232 (1888). Dr. Elizabeth Morgan, of 
contemporary fame, was jailed for nearly 2 years under a similar 
contempt of court provision. However, Dr. Morgan's conditions of 
imprisonment which brought many Americans to rage, were palatial 
compared to the federal penitentiary. 
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rather than part of a wholesale importation of constitutional 
language. In an official pronouncement, the Mormon Church stated 
These [raids] are no fiction but verifiable facts that 
we have had to put up with . . . . These errors have to 
be corrected, and it is our duty, so far as the law lays 
in our power, as it is the duty of all honorable men in 
these United States, to sustain the Constitution thereof 
and to oppose in all legitimate ways any infringement of 
that instrument.75 
A quick glance at the roles of delegates to the various Utah 
constitutional conventions reveals that the large majority of 
delegates were prominent religious leaders, of the sort likely to 
share the views of the church leadership, and in any event, 
faithfully espouse the official position. 
Drafters of Utah's early constitutions were intimately 
familiar with egregious searches of the sort unknown since the days 
of King George. Reason dictates that the drafters were acutely 
concerned with providing protection and remedies against unlawful 
searches and seizures.76 The majority of the drafters were men who 
75. First Presidency Message to General Conference [of the L.D.S. 
Church], Deseret News Weekly. April 14, 1886, at 196, cited in 
Panek, supra note 60 at 15. 
76. Legislation aimed at the Mormon practice of polygamy had 
already been introduced in 1856, the first of many such efforts. 
Larson, Government. Politics and Conflict, in Utah's History 244 
(R. Poll. ed. U.S.U. Press 1989). Notwithstanding, the Civil War 
proved a boon to the Mormons insofar as the federal government 
concentrated efforts elsewhere. President Lincoln, in 
characteristic fashion, stated "You tell Brigham Young, that if he 
will leave me alone, I'll leave him alone." 1^. Notwithstanding, 
it is interesting to note that after the federal anti-polygamy 
efforts began, the constitutional drafters placed the bill of 
rights at the beginning of the constitution, rather than at the 
end. See supra, note 56. Perhaps a subtle message was thereby 
intended. However, it may also be that the drafters noted that 
many contemporary state constitutions had placed their declaration 
of rights at the beginning, and merely followed suit. 
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had firsthand knowledge of abusive searches. John H. Smith, a 
Mormon apostle and President of the constitutional convention of 
1895, practiced polygamy and had been the target of marshal's 
searches.78 Several members of the subcommittee selected to draft 
the Declaration of Rights for the 1985 constitution had publicly 
protested the search and seizure practices of federal marshals.79 
Some may persuade that article I, section 14 is merely part 
of a pro forma incorporation of other state's bills of rights. 
Certainly the drafters had at hand other state constitutions, and 
desired to use any means or device which might make the proposed 
constitution and application for statehood more palatable to a 
hostile congress. However, the only objective evidence supporting 
this quick conclusion is found in the similar language of article 
I, section 14 language with like provisions. Contrasted to this, 
again one must recall the drafters' experiences with abusive 
searches. One might also, however, point to the lack of 
legislative history and wonder why the drafters would have remained 
silent about the adoption of a search and seizure provision. 
Perhaps the response to such concerns is in the demonstrated need 
77. Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 Utah Hist. Q. 95, 100 
(1957). 
78. White, The Making of the Convention President: The Political 
Education of John Henrv Smith. 39 Utah Hist. Q. 351, 357 (1971). 
79. Panek, supra note 60 at 27-28. 
80. The tortured efforts on the road to statehood for Utah are 
beyond the scope of this article. Sufficed it to say that both 
internal turmoil and animosity toward the practice of polygamy 
delayed Utah's admission. See generally, Firmage, Zion in the 
Courts 125-262 (1988). 
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to minimize protests and meekly approach Congress with statehood 
petitions, freshly remembering not only the marshals' bedroom 
incursions, but also the vitriolics of a Congress hostile to Utah 
statehood.81 One should also consider that the abuses of federal 
officers were common knowledge to all Utahns, and not topics 
requiring explicit memorialization in the convention notes. 
Article III provides evidence of the drafter's acute 
sensitivity to freedom from searches of home and property, 
providing that ,f[n]o inhabitant of this State shall ever be 
molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of 
religious belief . . . .,|82 While several other states' 
constitutions contain guarantees of religious liberty,83 Utah's 
provision is unique insofar as it proscribes disturbance of person 
or property. This language appeared in the constitution of 1896, 
and had no predecessor in earlier constitutions. It is in addition 
to language contained in the declaration of rights which assures 
freedom to worship according to conscience, a provision contained 
81. See Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government — The 
History of Utah's Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 319-22. 
82. One commentator has noted that "[a]lmost every imaginable 
protection for religious freedom" was included in the Utah 
constitution. Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State 
Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 326, 331. The Utah constitution 
is unique in its prohibition of any church, a purely private group, 
to interfere with or dominate the affairs of the state. Utah 
Constitution, article I, § 4. 
83. See, e.g., Constitution of the State of New York, art. I, § 
3; Constitution of the State of Idaho, art. I, § 4. 
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in most state constitutions. The Supreme Court of Montana has 
noted that its search and seizure clause, identical to the fourth 
amendment, must be construed to give greater protections against 
unreasonable search and seizure when considered in tandem with a 
separate clause prohibiting infringement on the right of privacy.85 
In the absence of an unambiguous statement of the drafter's 
intent, an advocate should argue the historical interpretation most 
favorable to her client. The parallel language of the state and 
federal search and seizure provisions must not deter the effective 
advocate. Justice Zimmerman has unequivocally noted that M[t]he 
federal law as it currently exists is certainly not the only 
permissible interpretation of the search and seizure protections 
contained in the Utah Constitution. . . . [s]ound argument may be 
made in favor of positions at variance with the current federal law 
respecting both the scope of the individual's right to be free from 
warrantless searches and seizures and the remedy for any violation 
84. The constitution of 1849 contained a strong and detailed 
provision for religious freedom in the declaration of rights. 
Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. VIII, § 3. This 
provision carried through in subsequent constitutions. See 
Constitution of Deseret, art. II, § 3 (1856); Constitution of the 
State of Deseret, art. II, § 3 (1862); Constitution of the State 
of Deseret, art. I, § 4 (1872); Constitution of the State of Utah, 
art. I, § 4 (1887). 
85. State v. Sawyer, 174 Mont. 512, 571 P.2d 1131 (1977). The 
Montana Constitution, art. II, § 10 provides "Right of privacy. 
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of 
a free society and shall not be infringed without a showing of a 
compelling state interest." See also. State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 
105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978) (compelling state interest, not probable 
cause, is the standard required to infringe on privacy expectations 
in light of construction of both sections). 
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of that right."86 The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that 
"[Utah] may construe its own constitution more narrowly than the 
federal constitution even though the provisions involved may be 
similar."87 This is by no means a maverick view; former Justice 
William Brennan has recognized that identical provisions may 
legitimately be construed as offering greater or lesser protection 
An 
than their federal counterparts. 
86. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring). 
87. State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981). See also 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted) ("choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat 
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal 
courts"). 
88. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 499-500 (1977). Many state courts 
have given a different construction to their textually parallel 
constitutional provisions. See generally. State v. Johnson, 68 
N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 
P.2d 51 (1974); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure 
in 1984; Death of the Phoenix, in Developments in State 
Constitutional Theory and State Courts 166 (B. McGraw, ed. 1985) 
[Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court termed the resurgence 
of state constitutional law a "phoenix-like resurrection." Mosk, 
The State Courts, in American Law; The Third Century 213, 216 (B. 
Schwartz, ed. 1976)]; Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal 
Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court. 62 Ky. L.J. 
873 (1975). 
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III. Constitutional Analysis: A Comparative Approach 
An additional analytical method discussed by Justice Hayes in 
Jewett focuses on the "sibling state approach." This is 
particularly appropriate when drafters examined and considered 
another state's constitution. As mentioned above, several other 
states' constitutions served as models for the drafters of the Utah 
constitution.91 This group, Iowa, Illinois, Nevada, New York and 
Washington, provides a logical body of jurisdictions against which 
to compare Utah's search and seizure provision. While it should 
be remembered that precise legislative history detailing the origin 
of article I, section 14, is lacking,92 logic dictates that the 
Iowa, Illinois and New York constitutions are particularly 
important, as early drafters had access and familiarity with these 
constitutions before drafting the first Utah constitution.93 The 
Nevada constitution must also be considered, as it may have been 
the source of the current text of Utah's search and seizure 
provision.94 A second group ripe for comparison are those states 
89. State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233, 237 (1985). 
90. See Heath v. Sears, 123 N.H. 512, 526, 464 A.2d 288, 296, cf. , 
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering, 471 A.2d 195, 200 (R.I. 1984). 
91. See supra notes 49-55. 
92. See supra note 51. 
93. See supra notes 52-53. 
94. The declaration of rights in early constitutions contained a 
simple statement that "[t]he people shall be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches 
and seizures." Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. VIII, 
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which also have search and seizure provisions which are textually 
identical or similar to the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution.95 
New York courts have consistently interpreted the New York 
Constitution as offering significantly greater protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures than does the fourth amendment. 
Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution contains two 
paragraphs, the first of which is identical to the fourth 
amendment.97 That identical provision was construed in People v. 
§ 6 (1849) . That text was modified to its present state, which 
matches the language of the fourth amendment, in 1872. The 
constitutional drafters of 1872 had ordered 125 copies of the 
Nevada constitution. Deseret News. February 28f 1872. The Nevada 
search and seizure clause is found in the Constitution of the State 
of Nevada, art I, § 18. Not only was the Nevada constitution from 
a neighboring state, but it had recently been approved by congress. 
The Nevada constitution was adopted in September of 1964, and 
Nevada was admitted to the union on October 31, 1864. Hickman 
notes that it was used as the principal reference tool for the 
drafting of the 1872 constitution. Hickman, Utah Constitutional 
Law, 49 (1954). 
95. The text of all fifty state constitutions may be found in 
Constitutions of the United States: National and State (F. Grad. 
ed., 2d ed. 1982). This multi-volume set also contains and index 
of states1 bills of rights, Fundamental Liberties & Rights, a 50-
state Index (B. Sachs, ed. 1980) . 
96. See generally. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 
N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556, 562 (1986); People v. Johnson, 66 
N.Y.2d 398, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439 (1985); People v. 
Langen, 60 N.Y.2d 170, 469 N.Y.S.2d 44, 456 N.E.2d 1167 (1983); 
People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 454, 465 N.Y.S.2d 896, 452 N.E.2d 1224 
(1983). 
97. The second paragraph of article I, section 12, addresses 
electronic surveillance, and closely parallels an applicable 
federal statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988). 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gokey. to not allow automatic searches of containers within the 
arrestee's control area, rejecting the United States Supreme 
Court's holding in New York v. Belton." The court stated that 
warrantless searches are deemed unreasonable under the New York 
Constitution unless justified by exigent circumstances.100 
In People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,101 the New York high court held 
that article I, section 12, requires a more precise standard for 
warrants for search and seizure of obscene material. The United 
States Supreme Court had determined that the questioned warrant did 
not violate fourth amendment standards.102 The court recognized 
that similar provisions in the federal and state constitutions 
ought to be subject to a uniform interpretation, then stated that 
"[w]hen weighed against the ability to protect fundamental 
constitutional rights, the practical need for uniformity can seldom 
be a decisive factor."103 Relying on a totality of the 
98. 60 N.Y.2d 309, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618, 457 N.E.2d 723 (1983). 
99. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Belton, the Supreme Court held that 
a warrantless search may be conducted of the passenger compartment 
of an arrestee's vehicle when he is arrested in the vehicle. Other 
state supreme courts have also rejected the Belton rule. See, 
e.g. . State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240, (1983) 
(vehicle searches contemporaneous to arrest are limited to the 
arrestee's reach area; warrant required to search arrestee's 
vehicle absent exigent circumstances); State v. Hernandez, 410 
So.2d 1381 (La. 1982) (a vehicle search contemporaneous to a lawful 
arrest is prohibited under Louisiana constitution, art. 1, § 5). 
100. 457 N.E.2d at 724. 
101. 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556 (1986). 
102. New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1986). 
103. 501 N.E.2d at 561. 
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circumstances approach, the United States Supreme Court had found 
that the evidence in the warrant application of the offensive 
sexual conduct portrayed in the films adequately compensated for 
the police failure to submit evidence that the sexually-explicit 
films violated community standards and lacked intrinsic value, and 
therefore was not fatal to the warrant.105 The New York Court of 
Appeals countered that the clear standard imposed by article I, 
section 12 required that the magistrate reviewing the warrant 
application consider "all aspects of the information supporting the 
application,"106 and found that the lack of evidence that the films 
violated community standards doomed the warrant and required 
suppression of the evidence.107 
Courts of the other members of the model group for the Utah 
constitutions, Illinois, and Iowa and Nevada, have eschewed 
constitutional construction at variance with the federal courts. 
The Nevada Supreme Court has paid little heed to its state 
constitution, offering only rare, passing comments.108 Both Iowa109 
104. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
105. 475 U.S. at 876-78. 
106. 501 N.E.2d at 563. 
107. 501 N.E.2d at 564. 
108. See Luciano v. Marshall, 95 Nev. 276, 593 P.2d 751 (1979). 
109. See State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986) 
(provisions identical in scope, import and purpose); but cf., 
Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (U.S. Supreme 
Court interpretations are persuasive, but not binding on Iowa 
courts). 
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and Illinois110 have thus far declined to construe their search and 
seizure provisions more broadly than the fourth amendment. 
Like New York, many states with search and seizure clauses 
which are identical, or nearly identical, to the fourth amendment 
have construed their state constitutions to offer stricter 
i 
standards of reasonableness. Many of our western neighbors are 
among this group. In State v. Henderson,111 the Idaho Supreme Court 
reversed a denial of a suppression order after scrutiny of a 
4 
sobriety enforcement roadblock under the Idaho constitution, which 
is identical to the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The court considered a state statute112 which 
authorizes roadblocks to apprehend persons reasonably believed to 
be in violation of Idaho law, and found reasonable suspicion to be 
a condition precedent to the use of a roadblock. Justice Huntley, 
writing for the majority, stated that the court reached its 
conclusion solely on the grounds of the state constitution.113 
California has been a leader in application of its state 
constitution to criminal law, particularly search and seizure 
issues.114 In People v. Lonawill,115 the California Supreme Court 
110. People v. Williams, 182 111. App. 3d 598, 131 111. Dec. 189, 
538 N.E.2d 564 (1989). 
111. 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988). 
112. Idaho Code § 19-621 (1988). 
113. 756 P.2d at 1063. 
114. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 
531 P.2d 1099 (1975). 
115. 14 Cal. 3d 943, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753 (1975). 
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held that arrested persons may not be subjected to a full body 
search unless and until the arrestee is actually incarcerated.116 
Thus, a person who is arrested and released after signing a promise 
to appear or a citation to that effect may not be searched, other 
than a pat-down search for weapons.117 This holding rejected the 
rules of search incident to arrest established by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson118 and Gustafson v. 
Florida.119 The court stated that on questions of individual 
liberties, the California Declaration of Rights would be its "first 
referent."120 
The California Supreme Court has also rejected the rule of 
United States v. Miller.121 Miller held that bank depositors 
abandoned any expectation of privacy of bank records when 
transacting business with the bank, thus allowing law enforcement 
officials ready access to bank account information.122 The 
California court found that a bank customer retains an expectation 
of privacy in bank records, and that the disclosure of information 
116. 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302. 
117. Id. 
118. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
119. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
120. 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302. 
121. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
122. Id. at 442-43. 
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through banking transactions was not voluntary, in that banking is 
an integral and necessary part of modern life.123 
Colorado joined California in rejecting the Miller rule in 
Charnes v. DiGiacomo.124 The Colorado Supreme Court conceded that 
Miller limited application of the fourth amendment to questions of 
expectation of privacy in bank records, but stated that the 
Colorado constitution, article II, section 7, provides a greater 
expectation of privacy than does its textually similar federal 
counterpart.125 Also following the California lead,126 Colorado has 
employed its state constitution to protect against warrantless 
installation of pen registers127 on telephone lines. In People v. 
Soorleder128 the Colorado Supreme Court noted that state 
constitution embodies the identical goal of the fourth amendment, 
123. Burrows v. Super. Ct. of San Bernadino Cty., 13 Cal. 3d 238, 
118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170-71, 529 P.2d 590 (1975). Burrows actually 
preceded the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller; however, it 
has subsequently been reaffirmed several times. Indeed, the 
Burrows rationale has been extended to telephone records and credit 
card billings. People v. Mejia, 95 Cal. App. 3d 828, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 233 (1979), rejecting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); 
People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738 
(1979). 
124. 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980). See also Commonwealth v. 
DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979) (also rejecting Miller, 
applying the Pennsylvania constitution). 
125. 612 P.2d at 1120. 
126. People v. Mejia, 95 Cal. App. 3d 828, 157 Cal. Rptr. 233 
(1979), rejecting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
127. A pen register is a device that records the outgoing number 
dialed, whether the call is answered and the duration of the call. 
It is used by police to gather phone numbers of possible associates 
of suspected criminals. 
128. 666 P.2d 135 (1983). 
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to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, 
unlike the United States Supreme Court's application of the fourth 
amendment,130 the Colorado Supreme Court found a protected privacy 
interest in telephone records. 
Oregon rounds out the list of western states131 with clauses 
textually similar to the fourth amendment, which nonetheless have 
been interpreted to offer greater protection against unreasonable 
searches. In State v. Lowrv, the Oregon Supreme Court held that 
small containers seized in a search incident to an arrest may be 
secured, but may not be examined without a search warrant. This 
decision rests squarely in conflict with United States v. 
129. 666 P.2d at 139. 
130. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
131. Hawaii, a state to the west, although not often considered a 
western state, has also interpreted its search and seizure clause, 
again identical to the fourth amendment, as imposing a more 
protective standard for searches incident to an arrest. State v. 
Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974). Washington has also 
construed its constitution as more restrictive of police searches. 
State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). However, 
in an unusual twist, the Washington constitutional drafters 
considered a clause textually identical to the fourth amendment and 
rejected it in favor of a simple one line statement, much the same 
as in the first two Utah constitutions. See State v. Simpson, 95 
Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980). Alaska has utilized an 
unique sociological argument in determining that its state 
constitution should be construed toward broader civil liberties 
protections. In Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503 (Alaska 1975), 
the Alaska Supreme Court based its holding on the frontier heritage 
of the state and the traditional notion of wanting to be left alone 
to cherish onefs solitude. However, it should be noted that the 
Alaska constitution, similar to that of Montana, see supra, note 
67, also contains an explicit guarantee of personal privacy. See 
also Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979); State v. Glass, 
583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978). 
132. 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983). 
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Robinson153 and Gustafson v. Florida J34 The Oregon Supreme Court 
has consistently exercised its right to decide constitutional 
questions under a primacy model ,135 avoiding resort to the federal 
constitution whenever possible.136 
One should not be left, however, with the impression that the 
trend of interpreting state constitutional search and seizure 
clauses more broadly than the similar federal counterpart is a 
western phenomena. Aside from New York, many of our eastern sister 
states have followed the same course.137 Notwithstanding, Utah 
courts have often followed the reasoning of neighbor states' 
courts, and have ample guidance in the area of state constitutional 
analysis, as applied to search and seizure law. 
IV. Conclusion 
Much of the movement toward greater usage of state 
constitutions has been prompted by judges dissatisfied with the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts1 pronounced retreat from the great 
133. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
134. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
135. See supra, note 30. 
136. See State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982) (citing 
cases)• 
137. See, e.g. . Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 
1983); State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 467 A.2d 571 (1983); State 
v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982); People v. Secrest, 413 
Mich. 521, 321 N.W.2d 368 (1982); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 
(R.I. 1980); Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979); 
State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). 
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civil liberties decisions of the Warren Court. This has prompted 
many conservative critics to cry foul when a state supreme court 
begins to take its own state's bill of rights more seriously, for 
whatever reason. This panic and distrust is misplaced. The very 
beauty of the "new federalism" is that decisions are being based 
on the documents most amenable to change by the people governed 
thereby. While the United States Supreme Court must necessarily 
. 139 
pursue a national agenda to some degree, state courts have been 
traditionally, and remain, accountable to the electorate.140 
Indeed, when then Chief Justice Burger felt his conservative views 
threatened by a state court, he took the unprecedented step of 
inviting the state's voters to rebel at the polls,141 a move that 
one state court justice termed simply "arrogant."142 The state 
138. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—Awav from a 
Reactionary Approach. 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1,2 (1981); Brennan, 
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). 
139. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court 
Comment on Federal Issues When Disposing of Cases on State 
Constitutional Grounds. 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1027, 1042-45 (1985). 
140. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States; The Revival of 
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights. 61 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 535, 549 (1986). 
141. In Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983), the Court was forced 
to dismiss a petition for certiorari on the basis that the decision 
below rested on adequate and independent state grounds, see 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). In his opinion 
concurring with the dismissal of certiorari, Chief Justice Burger 
reminded the people of Florida that they could cut back 
constitutional protections to federal levels by amending their 
state constitutions. 462 U.S. at 639. 
142. State v. Jackson, 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983) (Shea, 
J., dissenting). See also, Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court 
Activism. 63 Tex. L. Rev. 995 (1985). 
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court role as "constitutional laboratories" envisioned by 
conservative justices may once again be fulfilled.143 
Nor must civil libertarians despair. The United States 
Constitution remains the floor of guaranteed liberties. No state 
court can take away what the federal constitution grants. The 
federal courts will continue to "consider themselves in a peculiar 
manner the guardian of [constitutional] rights."144 
Judges of Utah's appellate courts have issued the call, 
attorneys must now respond. The Utah State Constitution must be 
studied, briefed and argued at every step of litigation, whenever 
applicable. As this article has shown, many factors must be 
considered in advancing state constitutional arguments. Article 
1, section 14 is but one example of how our own history and 
experiences may guide the courts of this state to sensitive, 
sensible decisions premised upon Utah's own constitution. 
143. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1978) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
144. Statement of James Madison, 1 Annals of Congress 439 (J. 
Gales, ed. 1789) quoted in Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the 
States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of 
Individual Rights. 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 552 (1986). 
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